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I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the Delaware corporate common law is the notion that
the actions of corporate management enjoy broad ranging deference in noncon-
flict transactions.' Directors and officers are relatively free to transact in fur-
therance of maximizing shareholder value without being second-guessed by
courts. 2 In limited instances, however, where directors and officers are self-
interested in a particular transaction, this deference disappears and the directors
and officers are generally charged with proving the entire fairness of the self-
interested transaction. 3 The Delaware courts have attempted to adapt this fidu-
ciary duty paradigm to develop the contours of the relationship between control-
ling and minority shareholders, though the relationship has been dubbed "an
aspect of Delaware law fraught with doctrinal tension."4 This traditional para-
digm has been recently challenged.
Recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery has delivered several opin-
ions that have dramatically affected the rights of minority shareholders in public
corporations.5 This Article will examine how this recent case law affects the
A "conflict transaction" is a transaction that is entered into by fiduciaries that have an inter-
est in the transaction. Thus, fiduciaries, usually corporate management or controlling stockhold-
ers, are said to "stand on both sides" of the transaction. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368,
1379 (Del. 1996) (stating that these transactions are susceptible to shareholder challenges on fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty grounds); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1985)
(describing a conflict transaction as one in which "a majority shareholder stands on both sides of a
transaction").
2 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (stating that, absent self-
interest, the decisions of corporate management will be shielded by the deferential business judg-
ment rule). Under the business judgment rule, if directors can demonstrate that they made a busi-
ness decision on an informed basis, in good faith, and without self-interest, the courts will respect
the board's decisions without holding the directors liable for unanticipated losses. See id. The
business judgment rule promotes several identifiable policies. First, the rule encourages informed
risk taking by directors because it shields them from personal liability for honest, good faith deci-
sions. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that investors can
diversify their portfolios to diminish their risks, and therefore an overly careful approach by direc-
tors seeking to minimize risk instead of maximizing gain is not in the best interests of investors).
Second, the business judgment rule discourages courts from reviewing business decisions in hind-
sight. See id. at 886 (recognizing that an entrepreneur's function is to make reasoned decisions
with less than perfect knowledge). Lastly, the business judgment rule prevents courts from re-
viewing the substance of business decisions, a task for which they are not equipped. See Weiss v.
Temp. Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated by 465 U.S. 1001, remanded to
730 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1984).
3 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
4 In re Pure Res. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421,433 (Del. Ch. 2002).
5 See id.; Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Co., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001); In re Aquila, Inc.
S'holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002) (refusing to enjoin tender offer on grounds that
such offers were voluntary transactions and holding that no fairness duty is to be imposed on
parent companies); In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch.
June 19, 2001) (involving a challenge of an exchange offer by a controlling stockholder of Sili-
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rights of minority shareholders under Delaware law,6 particularly in the context
of freeze-out and going private transactions. 7 Given the onslaught of regulation
accompanying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the incidence of corporations going
private will likely increase. 8 Thus, it is critically important for the Delaware
conix); In re Staples, Inc. S'holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding that
"[w]hen a board uses sufficient procedural protections - such as independent director approval or
a stockholder vote - judicial review of the fairness of an 'interested' transaction may, as a gen-
eral matter, be obviated").
6 While cases from other jurisdictions will be discussed, the main focus will be on Delaware
courts as Delaware has long been recognized as the leading jurisdiction in dealing with issues of
corporate law. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
REORGANIZATIONS 41 (1991). Over 320,000 corporations, sixty percent of Fortune 500 corpora-
tions, and more than one-half of the thirty companies listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
are incorporated in Delaware. See E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Delaware Courts in
Merger and Acquisition Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 856 (2001) (citing to the spring 2001
Dole Foods, Inc., proxy statement: "[Tlhe development in Delaware over the last century of a
well-established body of case law construing the Delaware General Corporation Law, which pro-
vides businesses with a greater measure of predictability than exists in any other jurisdic-
tion .... ). For a comparative study on minority shareholder rights that is not Delaware-specific,
see generally Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority
Shareholders -A Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 622 (2001).
7 In this Article, the terms "freeze-out," "controlling stockholder buyout" and "going private
transaction" will be used interchangeably. The term "going private transaction" can be defined as
"any transaction in which a shareholder or group of shareholders obtains the entire common eq-
uity interest in a company, and other shareholders receive cash, debt or preferred stock in ex-
change for their shares." IA MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 9.01 (2003). Commentators have used the term "freeze-out" in a different context,
namely referring to tactics in which controlling stockholders attempt to disadvantage minority
shareholders in close corporations. See generally A. Richard Blaiklock, Fiduciary Duties Owned
by Frozen-Out Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 30 IND. L. REV. 763 (1997). In the
close corporation context, controlling stockholders may withhold dividends from minority share-
holders or dilute the shares of minority shareholders by issuing new stock and controlling the
disposition of that stock. See Garza, supra note 6, at 622. A seminal work on the topic is F.
O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OF OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1961). For a
comprehensive description of the prevalence of freeze-outs in the corporate landscape, see John C.
Coates, IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict
Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54 n.2 (1999), discussing the prevalence of billion
dollar freeze-outs.
8 When a company goes private it is no longer obligated to comply with the costly reporting
and disclosure requirements mandated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-77mm (1997 & Supp. 2003)) ("Ex-
change Act") and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). For a discussion detailing the reasons for
going private, see infra note 36 and accompanying text. Going private transactions are poised for
a resurgence since their near extinction in the early 1990s. Indeed, as two experts have stated,
"Given shareholder fatigue from the prolonged decline in public equity values, readily available
private capital for equity investment in more mature companies and historically low interest rates,
taking a company private may be the crack in the current economic wall." Michael J. Levitin &
Steven S. Snider, Going Public: Been There, Done That, "Going Private" Now, WASH. BUS. J.,
Oct. 21, 2002, http:llwashington.bizjoumals.comlWashington/stoies/2002/10/21/focus4.html; see
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judiciary to establish a coherent framework for transacting parties to rely upon
in crafting the mechanics of these transactions.
While most publicly traded corporations are comprised of a dispersed
ownership structure - a structure where no single shareholder owns control of
the company - several corporations have a controlling shareholder. 9 This con-
trolling shareholder plays an important role when the corporation undertakes a
merger or freeze-out transaction. To consummate a freeze-out, most state cor-
porate law statutes require the approval of both the corporation's board of direc-
tors and majority shareholder.' 0 A controlling shareholder who moves to obtain
the entire common equity interest can unilaterally set the price of the minority's
stock as well as control the merger's approval.
While the controlling stockholder can legally freeze out the minority on
his own terms, minority shareholders are generally afforded two remedies if
they feel their stock is undervalued. First, pursuant to Delaware General
Corporation Law section 262(b), the minority shareholder can obtain judicial
appraisal of their stock." This remedy allows the minority to receive the
value of their stock as determined by the court, not the freeze-out price.
12
Second, minority shareholders can seek judicial review of the merger itself.
Because the freeze-out merger is inherently a conflict transaction, courts will
generally invoke the entire fairness standard of review, which may ulti-
mately allow the minority damages if the court determines that the value of
the stock exceeds the freeze-out purchase price.
13
also Frank Aquila & Jonathan Gluck, Sarbanes-Oxley and the "Law of Unintended Conse-
quences": Public Companies Opting to Go Private, M&A LAW., Oct. 2002, at 16; Margaret
Johnsson & Fran Wiechart, New Regulations: Preparing for the Unplanned Costs, FIN.
EXECUTIVE, Jan. 2003, at 16-18 (estimating the costs of complying with Sarbanes Oxley to range
from $4 million to $9 million for initial costs of average-sized Fortune 500 companies and annual
costs from $3 million to $8 million); Clifford E. Neimeth, One Step or Two? (Delaware's Going
Private Dichotomy), J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE, Winter 2002/2003, at 30.
9 Michael Barclay & Clifford Holdemess, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corpora-
tions, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 371-72 (1989) (stating that twenty percent of companies of a ran-
domly chosen sample had a controlling shareholder). For an interesting, well-documented explo-
ration into the intricacies of the dispersed ownership phenomenon, see generally Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Corporate Defense Law for Dispersed Ownership, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2001).
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess. legislation). It is
important to note that "situations where a controlling shareholder has a majority interest and one
where the controlling shareholder has an impregnable although non-majority interest are essen-
tially the same from the point of view of their legal constraints." ARTHUR M. BORDEN & JOEL A.
YUNIs, GOING PRIVATE § 102, at 1-3 (2002). Note, however, there is an important distinction
made from the perspective of federal securities liability in this regard. See LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 904[l][a][ii].
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2001).
12 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-15 (Del. 1983).
13 See id. at 714. For a plenary discussion of the entire fairness standard, see infra notes 85-
109 and accompanying text.
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The premise underlying the assertion of entire fairness review is sound:
"When a majority shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction, the re-
quirement of fairness is 'unflinching' in its demand that the controlling stock-
holder establish the entire fairness of the undertaking sufficient to pass the test
of careful scrutiny by the courts."' 4 The Delaware Court of Chancery in In re
Pure Resources Shareholders Litigation recently undermined the "unflinching"
and longstanding entire fairness protection afforded to minority shareholders in
this context.'
5
In Pure Resources, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed whether
there was enough utility to justify continuing the stricter scrutiny of interested
mergers that condition the transaction on a majority of the minority stockholder
vote and/or where a special committee of independent directors is formed.' 6 For
reasons to be discussed in this Article,' 7 courts have traditionally perceived
these so-called "intra-corporate cleansing mechanisms" as inherently suspect.'
8
For instance, the formation of a special committee of independent directors and
conditioning the conflict transaction on approval of a majority of the minority
vote did not displace entire fairness review.' 9 However, this layer of protection
to minority shareholders was removed in Pure Resources and several other re-
cent decisions.20
This Article argues that the recent Delaware case law is misguided as it
abrogates entire fairness review in a conflict transaction setting - a fundamental
notion that has been endorsed and upheld as integral to Delaware's merger re-
view paradigm. Central to this argument is the longstanding notion that the
Pure Resources court has expressly ignored - despite the employ of independent
committees and the like - the entire fairness standard should still apply to self-
interested transactions. This is because "the underlying factors which raise the
14 Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1985).
is 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
16 See id. at 422-23. The author of the Pure Resources opinion, Vice-Chancellor Strine, along
with his colleagues, former Chancellor William T. Allen, and Vice-Chancellor Jacobs, initially
addressed this question in, William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1303 (2001). For a discus-
sion on these purported cleansing mechanisms, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
17 See infra Part VI.
18 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
19 See id. at 1117 (holding that approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority of
shareholders and a majority on a committee of independent directors does not displace entire
fairness review but "shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff').
20 See Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 422-23; see also Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Co., 777 A.2d
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specter of impropriety can never be completely eradicated."2 Moreover, for
reasons to be discussed, the Court of Chancery's erroneous departure from the
application of entire fairness review will necessarily deal a debilitating blow to
minority shareholders' interests in the freeze-out context.
Part II of this Article briefly examines the mechanics of freeze-outs in
the corporate landscape. The early literature on freeze-outs will form a reveal-
ing backdrop that will accommodate the current legal issues surrounding freeze-
outs. This Part also explores the different ways controlling stockholders could
effectuate a buyout of the minority, namely through either a negotiated merger
or tender offer. As the court demonstrated in Pure Resources, the distinction
between the two alternative ways of effectuating a buyout is an important one;
the method employed to consummate the freeze-out will often govern the ex
post judicial standard of review. The transaction mechanics of both methods as
well as the intra-corporate cleansing mechanisms invoked by acquirors are dis-
cussed.
Part III discusses the legal relationship between controlling and minor-
ity shareholders. This Part discusses the specific duties arising out of freeze-out
transactions prior to Pure Resources and the other related case law. Central to
this discussion is an analysis of several recent Delaware cases that have ad-
dressed entire fairness review in the freeze-out context. 2 The doctrinal tension
between Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems23 and its progeny and Solomon
v. Pathe Communications Corp.24 and its progeny is examined.
Part IV examines the Pure Resources decision. The underlying negotia-
tions and mechanics of the transaction between Unocal and Pure Resources will
be assessed. This Part focuses on Vice-Chancellor Strine's departure from Kahn
and his modification and endorsement of the Solomon standard of review-so
long as the exchange offer is "structured in a manner that reduces the distorting
effect of the tendering process on free stockholder choice and by ensuring mi-
nority stockholders a candid and unfettered tendering recommendation from the
independent directors of the target board., 25 The doctrinal problems with this
opinion as well as the practical effects the decision will ultimately have on
transacting parties and their counsel are discussed. Additionally, this Part dis-
21 Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (declining to defer to a decision
made by special independent committee of directors).
22 See Unocal Exploration, 777 A.2d 242 (limiting the application of entire fairness review
and establishing that a parent corporation need not demonstrate fairness with respect to a short-
form merger pursuant to section 253 of the Delaware Code); In re Aquila, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002) (refusing to enjoin tender offer on grounds that such offers were
voluntary transactions and holding that no fairness duty is to be imposed on parent companies);
Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787 (involving a challenge of an exchange offer by a controlling stock-
holder of Siliconix).
23 638 A.2d 1110.
24 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
25 Pure Res.. 808 A.2d at 424.
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cusses the requirement established in Pure Resources that requires a minority
stockholder be given a "fair summary" of the investment bankers' findings. 16
Part V draws on the lengthy discussion of Vice-Chancellor Strine in
Pure Resources regarding the justifications for treating tender offers and negoti-
ated mergers differently. 7 Central to this discussion was the Vice-Chancellor's
finding that the same concerns exist when a controlling person seeks to acquire
the minority's stock irrespective of whether he or she employs a tender offer or
negotiated merger to achieve his or her end. 8 The concerns arising out of Kahn
that relate to the integrity of the special disinterested director committee process,
the informational advantages of controlling stockholders and the minority
shareholder's fear of retributive threats in the event of a no vote are discussed in
the context of both tender offer and negotiated merger transaction types. This
part argues that these concerns persist in both transaction types and thus, the
Delaware courts should treat them the same way.
Part VI argues that the exclusive application of entire fairness review to
interested transactions is proper, particularly in light of the fact that a controlling
party proposes and controls the transaction and its essential terms. Entire fair-
ness review should apply irrespective of whether a tender offer or negotiated
merger is employed. In both tender offers and negotiated mergers, the control-
ling stockholder will always have the potential to influence, however subtly, the
vote of minority stockholders in a manner that would not be of concern in a
transaction with a noncontrolling party. Consequently, full disclosure of mate-
rial facts to ratifying minority stockholders is inadequate. Therefore, procedural
protection via the entire fairness doctrine should have been upheld in Pure Re-
sources.
Part VII explores the economic theory of freeze-outs. It assesses the so-
cial utility of freeze-outs and the social costs freeze-out transactions impose on
society. Additionally, the transaction costs, incentives and externalities associ-
ated with freeze-outs and the entire fairness review are examined. While there
may be benefits to freeze-outs, these transactions result in inefficiencies and
diminish overall social welfare. Since freeze-out transactions appear to be so-
cially sub-optimal under both the Pareto efficiency model and the Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency model, enhancing scrutiny of these transactions may have the effect
of reducing their incidence. Furthermore, entire fairness review potentially en-
courages fair dealing between the majority and minority shareholders.
After examining whether applying entire fairness review to freeze-outs
is consistent with the Delaware corporate law paradigm, this Article argues that
there is no policy-laden reason to depart from a longstanding framework that
subjects conflict transactions to stricter scrutiny. Moreover, the judicial institu-
tion performing the review - the Delaware Court of Chancery - is doing so effi-
26 See infra Part IV.C.
27 See Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 441-43.
28 See id. at 443.
2004]
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ciently and expeditiously. Given the inadequacies of the appraisal remedy, it is
necessary to protect minority shareholders when they are faced with the pros-
pect of being frozen out.
Since nothing has occurred to change the court's perception of the
tainted dangers inherent in conflict transactions since Kahn, the Article ulti-
mately suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court should reexamine Pure Re-
sources and Delaware's treatment of tender offers commenced by controlling
parties and reinstate the functional balance it established in Kahn and its prog-
eny.
II. FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Freeze-outs in Legal and Economic Literature
There has been considerable commentary on freeze-out transactions. 29
There was much controversy surrounding freeze-outs as they became prevalent
in the 1970s.30 As a result of poor market conditions in the mid-1970s control-
ling stockholders and corporate management sought to realize control of corpo-
rations at relatively inexpensive prices.31 After several controlling parties made
large profits by taking companies public and then private, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") responded with Rule 13e-3 that sought to pro-
tect shareholders with disclosure requirements.32 The SEC promulgated the rule
33because of conflict of interest concerns arising from these transactions.
29 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of
Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985); Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New
Tort orNo Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management
Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57 (1990); Victor Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent
Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63 (1978); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Victor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE. L.J. 1354 (1978) [here-
inafter Brudney & Chirelstein, Corporate Freezeouts]; Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in
Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1988); Jan G.
Deutsch, The Mysteries of Corporate Law: A Response to Brudney and Chirelstein, 88 YALE L.J.
235 (1978); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 487 (1976); Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985); Dale
Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207 (1988); Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A His-
torical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (198 1).
30 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.01 [5].
31 See id.
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003). Schedule 13E-3 disclosures focus on share valuation opin-
ions and the fairness of the transaction. See id. § 240.13e-100, Item 9 on Schedule 13E-3.
33 See John L. Graham & John J. Kelly III, Tempted to Leave Wall Street: Old Economy
Company Executives Examine Prospects of Going Private, N.Y.L.J., May I, 2000, at S4, avail-
able at LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYLAWJ File.
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Several commentators perceived these transactions as harmful to minor-
ity stockholders because of the relatively unfettered ability of the controlling
stockholder to displace the minority's interest.34 Not surprisingly, they argued
for per se bans of freeze-outs or for legal rules restricting them.35 Conversely,
other commentators argued that freeze-outs yield advantages to stockholders as
they promote the efficient allocation of societal resources. 36 These commenta-
tors concluded that freeze-outs should be permitted - subject to disclosure and
fairness rules.37
Quintessential to these debates was the debate over what legal standards
should be applied to freeze-out transactions. 8 While this debate was overshad-
owed by the 1980's takeover controversy,39 it has abruptly resurfaced once
See Brudney & Chirelstein, Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 29, at 1359 (arguing that
"pure going private transactions are of small value and high risk and hence should be prohibited").
35 See id.
36 Indeed, freeze-outs have many benefits. These benefits include inter alia:
permitting control persons to acquire 100% ownership of assets undervalued
in the stock market, whether because of short-termism or because control per-
sons need not discount stock values to reflect agency risks, and so returning
cash for investors to use in more highly valued investments; permitting control
persons to obtain 100% upside in potential new, riskier projects or invest-
ments ... , and encouraging control persons to devote "socially optimal" ef-
fort in such projects and investments; reducing agency costs and conflicts of
interests by increasing ownership concentration and improving owner over-
sight; providing protection against or alternative to a hostile takeover; reduc-
ing the cost of capital by replacing high-cost equity capital with low-cost debt
capital; reducing creditor apprehension and low employee morale resulting
from poor stock performance; permitting corporate managers or other share-
holders to convert illiquid investments into cash; eliminating competitively
disadvantageous disclosure requirements; eliminating the costs of having
public shareholders, including costs of shareholder relations and meetings, au-
diting and legal fees, transfer agents, stock certificates, and the like, and
eliminating exposure to shareholder litigation; and increasing a company's
"tax shield" by replacing non-deductible stock dividends with deductible in-
terests payments.
LiPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.01[2] (footnotes omitted). Additionally, another com-
mon argument for allowing freeze-outs is that they facilitate the capturing of synergistic value
that, absent these transactions, would not be available. See Coates, supra note 7, at 1327. Relat-
edly, Professor Coates questions the notion that a ban on freeze-outs would have much social
welfare. See id. at 1329.
37 See, e.g., Borden, supra note 29, at 1006 (arguing for regulation of price); Oesterle & Nor-
berg, supra note 29, at 243-45 (arguing for disclosure regulations). Other commentators have
argued for legal rules ensuring a meaningful shareholder vote, e.g., Booth, supra note 29, at 659-
60, and for mandated independent committees to represent shareholders. E.g., Oesterle & Nor-
berg, supra note 29, at 241-43.
38 See Greene, supra note 29, at 518; Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 782-84.
39 For discussions on the illustrious hostile takeover frenzy of the 1970s and 1980s and the
legal debates surrounding those events, see generally BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR,
20041
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again.40 The Delaware courts have continually struggled to fashion a solution to
this daunting problem.
41
Initially, the entire fairness model was applied and courts modified the
standard in light of the different factual circumstances they were confronted
with.42 Because of the potential abuse and conflicts in freeze-out transactions,
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense
of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1423 (1993); John C. Carter, The Rights of Other Corporate Constituencies, 22 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 491 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role]; Daniel R. Fischel,
Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corpora-
tions: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:
An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No:
A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857
(1993); Thomas Lee Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77 (1988); Dale Arthur Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of
Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (1988); Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987); Mark A. Sargent, On the
Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
689, 712 (1981); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L.
381, 384 (2002), describing the takeover environment of the mid-I 980s as an "era of open corporate
warfare."
40 See generally Allen et al., supra note 16, at 1287 (discussing the need to address the doc-
trinal tensions relating to fiduciary standards of conduct under Delaware law). The question of
what standard of review should be applied to directorial action in the mergers and acquisitions
context has been raised in other areas. For instance, what standards of review to be applied to
board-adopted defensive and protective measures have been prevalent in legal literature. See, e.g.,
Frederick H. Alexander, Reining in Good Intentions: Common Law Protections of Voting Rights, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 897, 899 (2001); Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck:
Determining the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Ana-
lyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609, 1615 (2000); E. Norman Veasey, Law and
Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (explain-
ing the question of whether to apply the business judgment rule or a more substantive standard to
deal protection provisions); Ely R. Levy, Note, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bank-
ruptcy Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1361 (2002) (arguing for the application of a "best interests" standard where the
shareholder franchise is constrained by provisions in merger agreements).
41 See In re Pure Res. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 2002).
42 See Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (establishing the entire
fairness standard of review in conflict transactions), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The test established in Tanzer was later modified in the seminal case of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701. Prior to Weinberger, under Singer v. Magnavox Co., the
proponent of the conflict transaction was required to affirmatively demonstrate that a proposed
transaction was in line with a legitimate business purpose. 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled in part by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
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courts felt that stricter scrutiny was warranted 3  The doctrinal tensions that
were prevalent, when freeze-outs became commonplace in the corporate land-
scape, have circled back to the forefront in Delaware's corporate jurisprudence.
As will be demonstrated, this longstanding concern for minority interests in the
freeze-out context has been challenged and undermined by recent Delaware case
law.44 These recent cases have coalesced to erode minority shareholder rights
by allowing corporate planners to craftily evade the entire fairness standard.
B. The Tender Offer/Negotiated Merger Distinction
Under Delaware law, a majority shareholder has a legal right to buyout
the shares of minority shareholders.45 Often, it is the corporation's officers and
directors who are the controlling stockholders. 46 Controlling stockholder buy-
outs share several common characteristics. A controlling stockholder acquiror
will structure the transaction in one of two ways: the acquiror will effectuate a
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The Weinberger court abrogated the "business purpose" test; however,
the test has survived in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club,
Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (articulating the "business purpose" test under Massa-
chusetts law).
The corporate directors who benefit from this transfer of ownership must
demonstrate how the legitimate goals of the corporation are furthered ....
Because the danger of abuse of fiduciary duty is especially great in a freeze-
out merger, the court must be satisfied that the freeze-out was for the ad-
vancement of a legitimate corporate purpose. If satisfied that elimination of
public ownership is in furtherance of a business purpose, the court should then
proceed to determine if the transaction was fair by examining the totality of
the circumstances.
Id. at 1118 (citations omitted).
43 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1985) ("When a majority
shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction, the requirement of fairness is unflinching in its
demand that the controlling stockholder establish the entire fairness of the undertaking sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.").
44 See infra notes 133-60 and accompanying text.
45 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001); see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).
46 This type of transaction is frequently referred to as an MBO (management buyout).
A management buyout is the purchase of a target company by a newly-formed
company comprising the target's old management and new partners as major-
ity equity holders. The management buyout gives rise to a conflict of interest.
The old management and new partners use the new company to buy the old
company, which is the target of the merger. Management has an incentive to
make the merger succeed to the detriment of the old company. This merger
raises questions of self-dealing and fairness because majority shareholders buy
their old company along with the minority's interest.
Garza, supra note 6, at 624 (footnotes omitted).
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negotiated single-step merger or, in the alternative, a two-step acquisition where
the controlling stockholder conducts a tender or exchange offer for the public
equity and subsequently completes a second-step merger. Despite the fact that
both transactions effectively achieve the same result - the controlling stock-
holder owning all of the corporation's outstanding equity as a concern - the
method employed is crucial after the Pure Resources decision.47
In a tender offer, the controlling stockholder will offer to purchase the
minority's stock for a cash consideration.48 If most of the stockholders tender
into the offer, a second-step merger pursuant to section 253 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law usually follows. 49 The need for a second-step merger
following a successful tender is necessary because a tender offer "will never
result in all outstanding stock being tendered., 50  As a result of the successful
tender offer, the controlling stockholder will have sufficient voting power to
effectuate the second-step merger.5' The second-step merger will subsequently
47 See infra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
48 If the consideration offered in return for the stock is something other than cash, i.e., stock
bonds, debentures and the like, the offer is an exchange offer. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating
the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1984). The Williams Act, part of the Exchange Act,
principally regulates tender offers. See Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (2000)). The rules governing tender offers center on the offeror's disclosure
of his identity, funding and purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n. Additionally, the Williams Act man-
dates that if an acquiror offers to purchase only a portion of the outstanding shares, and the hold-
ers tender more than the number that the bidder has offered to purchase, the acquiror must pur-
chase in the same proportion from each stockholder. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(3), .14d-8
(2003). While the offer is required to be open for at least twenty business days, any increase in
price before the expiration thereof requires such price to be increased to each stockholder whose
shares were tendered prior to the increase. See id. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(3), .14e-l(a). These require-
ments are said to level the playing field between acquirors and tendering stockholders. There has
been considerable commentary on the detrimental effects, burdensome costs, and inefficiencies
resulting from regulating the market for corporate control. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. I (1982); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Targets Gain
from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
39; Gilson, supra note 39.
49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
50 See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 153, 162 n.33 (1986) ("Some shareholders may not be aware of the tender offer or even
aware that they are shareholders."). In his article, Leebron demonstrates that tender offers and
negotiated mergers distribute gains differently, which subsequently influences the size and types
of gains created. See id. at 215-16. He argues that tender offers should be regulated like mergers
- through enabling statutes that establish default rules of minimal standards allowing for varia-
tion in the corporate charter. See id. at 218.
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eliminate the non-tendering minority, thereby allowing the acquiror to achieve
its purpose. 5 3 While the Delaware General Corporation Law does not address
tender offers,53 a tender offer by the controlling stockholder could potentially be
subject to the disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 13e-3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 54
The use of a tender offer carries with it certain benefits and drawbacks.
Complete control of the corporation will probably be gained less expensively by
using a tender offer, though this contention has been the subject of debate. 55
As a matter of statutory law, this way of proceeding is different from the ne-
gotiated merger approach in an important way: neither the tender offer nor the
short-form merger requires any action by the subsidiary's board of directors.
The tender offer takes place between the controlling shareholder and the mi-
nority shareholders so long as the offering conditions are met. And, by ex-
plicit terms of [title 28,] § 253 [of the Delaware Code], the short-form merger
can be effected by the controlling stockholder itself, ....
Id. at 437.
52 From the aquiror's point of view this is essential because retaining even a small minority of
stockholders may obstruct the goals of the acquiror, namely the avoidance of costly securities
disclosure requirements.
53 See generally DEL. CODE. ANN. tit., §§ 101-398 (2001 & Supp. 2002). "Tender offers are
not addressed by the Delaware General Corporation Law, a factor that has been of great impor-
tance in shaping the line of decisional law addressing tender offers by controlling stockholders
.... Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 437. In this respect the Vice-Chancellor Strine craftily described
the judicial processes in molding the Delaware corporate common law:
Much of the judicial carpentry in the corporate law occurs in this context, in
which judges must supplement the broadly enabling features of statutory cor-
poration law with equitable principles sufficient to protect against abuse and
unfairness, but not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions that could increase
the shareholder and societal wealth generated by the corporate form. In build-
ing the common law, judges forced to balance these concerns cannot escape
making normative choices, based on imperfect information about the world.
Id. at 434.
5 Generally, Rule 13e-3 applies to transactions that have a "'reasonable likelihood' or 'pur-
pose' of producing . . . a 'Rule 13e-3 effect."' LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, §
9.04[11][a][iii]. A Rule 13e-3 effect has been defined as the termination of disclosure obligations
under the Exchange Act "by virtue of causing a class of equity securities to be held of record by
less than 300 persons or causing the equity security to be neither listed on a national securities
exchange nor authorized to be quoted on the NASDAQ Stock Market." id. The Rule requires a
series of disclosures as to the fairness of the transaction. These disclosures must prominently
inform shareholders of the transaction's purpose, the reasons for the transaction's timing, any
potential quantifiable detriments to shareholders, and other alternative transactions considered.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3(e)(I), .13e-100, Item 7 on Schedule 13E-3. Additionally, the Rule
imposes waiting periods prior to consummation of such transactions as well as filing require-
ments. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.04[l].
s5 Compare Leebron, supra note 50, at 158 (arguing that "although tender offers and negoti-
ated mergers serve essentially identical purposes, an acquirer may be able to pay less in a tender
offer because of certain limitations on the stock market's ability to fully value the acquired firm"),
with Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 39, at 1169 (stating that "a tender offer is by
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Additionally, fairness of the tender offer price may be less subject to judicial
scrutiny than in conventional negotiated mergers. 56 This derives from the theo-
retical presumption that each stockholder makes his or her own decision
whether to tender into the offer. Put another way, no tendering stockholder of
the acquired entity could plausibly claim that the board of directors approved an
unfair offer. Therefore, courts have traditionally reviewed tender offers deferen-
tially.57
Alternatively, tender offers often require the acquirer to offer a premium
to attract an adequate number of tendering stockholders. This premium, coupled
with the costs of publicizing the offer, can increase the cost of a tender offer
above the market value of the shares before the offer is initiated.58 The tender
offer itself can be contested or subject to costly litigation as well. More impor-
tantly, the acquirer in the tender offer context may not have the opportunity to
conduct sufficient due diligence exercises, whereas in a negotiated merger thor-
ough due diligence prospects are increased. 59 Furthermore, the acquiror may not
far the more costly device"). For a discussion on the transaction costs of tender offers, see Gilson,
supra note 39, at 841 n.86.
56 It is important to note, that while the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") initially
sought to regulate the substantive fairness of these transactions, see Going Private Transactions,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090 (proposed Nov. 23, 1977) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), the Supreme Court in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977), held that the purpose of the securities laws was to "'substitute a philosophy of full disclo-
sure' and the fairness of the transaction was peripheral to this purpose. Id. at 477 (quoting Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 158 (1972)). Moreover, the Court stated that
since state general corporation statutes already contemplate breaches of fiduciary duty in connec-
tion with securities transactions, it would be inappropriate for these duties to be federalized. See
id. at 478. Since Sante Fe, the SEC has refrained from substantively reviewing freeze-outs
thereby paving the way for the development of state court scrutiny. See Going Private Transac-
tions, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6100, 44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (Aug. 8, 1979) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections at II, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), the Sante Fe framework may be
challenged as the federal initiatives target conduct in the boardroom, behavior that has tradition-
ally been under the purview of state laws and courts. For a discussion relating to these important
issues, see generally Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for Officer,
Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 897 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations,
76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 953 (2002); see also Lawrence Lederman, et al., A Blow for States, DAILY
DEAL, Oct. 26, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, DADEAL File.
57 Whether this is solid judicial policy when a tender offer is commenced by a controlling
fiduciary will be discussed infra in Part V. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59 See Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, Purchasing the Stock of a Privately Held Com-
pany: The Legal Effect of an Acquisition Review, 51 Bus. LAW. 479, 489 n.42 (1996).
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be able to realize as many representations and warranties from the acquired
party.6
0
A controlling stockholder may opt for a negotiated merger that is a
"bargaining transaction, the terms of which are negotiated by the managements
of the merging firms.' In the case of a controlling stockholder, the bargaining
will ensue between the controlling stockholder who may be the corporation's
management, and the minority stockholders. To protect the minority stockhold-
ers, the controlling stockholder usually appoints a special committee of disinter-
ested independent directors to represent the minority's interests in the negotia-
tions. Furthermore, the controlling stockholder may also condition the con-
summation of the freeze-out on approval of a majority of the outstanding minor-
ity stock.
These mechanisms are said to mitigate the potentially abusive effects of
the controlling stockholder's voting ability to approve the merger.62 While in-
corporating these mechanisms does not ensure a litigation-free transaction, the
risk of litigation is seemingly diminished.63 As will be discussed, the eviden-
tiary burdens in litigation concerning the transaction may potentially be affected
because of the presence of these mechanisms - even more so after Pure Re-
sources.
64
While not required under Delaware law, a special committee of inde-
pendent directors is quite routine in freeze-out transactions. 65 In its representa-
tion of the minority stockholders, the special committee will "negotiate with
representatives of the parent company in an attempt to recreate the arm's length
bargaining process that would otherwise be absent in a parent/subsidiary trans-
action." 66 Ideally, the special committee should have broad powers to engage
counsel's assistance, negotiate the price of the transactions, and prepare a rec-
ommendation to the board. These tasks should be performed in conjunction with
the main function of the committee, namely "to aggressively seek to promote
and protect minority interests.' 67
60 See id. at 486 n. 22.
61 See Leebron, supra note 50, at 179.
62 By the technique of making a nonwaiveable majority of the minority vote condition to a
merger, "the ability of the controlling stockholder to both offer and accept is taken away, and the
sell-side decision-making authority is given to the minority stockholders." In re Pure Res.
S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 442 (Del. Ch. 2002).
63 See infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
65 See LIPrON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.06[11].
66 Id.
67 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 870, 884 (1988).
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The majority of the minority provision is another mechanism used to
protect the minority's interest. The consummation of the freeze-out transaction
is conditioned on a majority of the stockholders that are unaffiliated with the
controlling stockholder approving the transaction. This mechanism can be pre-
sent in both the tender offer and negotiated merger contexts. The nonaffiliated
majority of the minority shareholders would approve the transaction either by
vote in a negotiated merger or by tender in a tender offer.68
The controlling stockholder seeking to acquire the entire outstanding
common equity interests - by either tender offer or negotiated merger - must
contemplate the likelihood of litigation. As will be discussed, the way in which
the controlling stockholder structures the freeze-out ex ante will affect the rigor-
ousness of the ex post review afforded to a particular transaction.
III. THE MAJORITY/MINORITY SHAREHOLDER DYNAMIC
Minority ownership in a corporation generally refers to "any share-
holder who owns stock representing less than fifty percent of a corporation's
capital." 69 Notwithstanding, a shareholder who owns less than fifty percent of a
corporation's outstanding stock can be deemed to have controlling status if the
shareholder exerts control through conduct or if the ability to dictate a transac-
tion is demonstrated. 70  Thus, "a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it
owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the
corporation."
71
Both directors as well as controlling stockholders owe fiduciary duties
to minority shareholders. 72 Controlling shareholders are brought under the fidu-
ciary duty paradigm because their inherent status as controlling persons is ac-
companied by voting power - voting power that facilitates decision-making
authority, particularly in light of their ability to remove and elect corporate
68 The Pure Resources court noted in dicta that parties that have employment, severance, or
other contractual agreements, with the controlling stockholder that create voting incentives are not
considered unaffiliated. 808 A.2d 441,446-47 (Del. Ch. 2002).
69 See Garza, supra note 6, at 620.
70 See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1984) (stating
that only stockholders with controlling status are fiduciaries).
71 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (emphasis
added). It is important to note that the plaintiff is charged with the burden to adduce evidence
demonstrating the control status of a stockholder, i.e., that the stockholder dictated the terms of the
transaction. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984) (stating that a
stockholder who owns less than fifty percent of a corporation's outstanding equity does not, with-
out plaintiff demonstrating more, become a controlling person); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693,
695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
72 See 2 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 14.16 (Supp. 1998); see also Ivanhoe Part-
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management. 3 Thus, subjecting controlling shareholders to the fiduciary rubric
presumably deters or, at the very least, constrains self-dealing transactions.74
The prospect of a minority shareholder action against the directors and/or con-
trolling stockholders serves as a check on these fiduciaries.75
A. Rights and Duties of the Majority Shareholder
Under Delaware law, controlling shareholders have a legal right to
"(a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up of a corporation; (c) merge it with an-
other company; (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of
incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or
(g) otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public stock-
holders' interests. 76 The controlling stockholder's exercise of these rights is
subject to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by the majority to the
minority stockholders.
The duty of care mandates that management and controlling stockhold-
ers act in good faith, with ordinary care, and "in a manner the director reasona-
bly believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 77 This duty is inter-
connected with the business judgment rule defense - a management-friendly
73 See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d I110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (expressing
concern over the voting rights of controlling stockholders and decision-making); Citron v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990) (describing a controlling stock-
holder's inherent coercive voting authority).
74 Several law and economics scholars have challenged the social and economic utility of
regulating self-dealing transactions, corporate opportunities and the like. In this regard, the Chi-
cagoans focus on how the fruits of insider trading and other corporate opportunities in the hands
of corporate management would not harm shareholders, but rather such benefits would be offset
by reductions in compensation. On this fascinating debate, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); HENRY G. MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control, supra note 48, at 734-35; David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of
Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1461-62 (1986); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and
the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 567 (1970); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule
lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 805 (1980). But cf. Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 487 (1999) (arguing that the costs of managerial value diversion can conceivably out-
weigh the benefit to shareholders); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing against the aforementioned
free market models and asserting that it is implausible to assume that the level of managerial pay
is set by a disinterested agent seeking to maximize share value); Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in
a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023
(2002) (rejecting any and all law and economics rationales that the market will correct IPO spin-
ning to corporate management).
75 See Garza, supra note 6, at 620.
76 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994).
77 See MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2002).
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protective layer. Under the business judgment analysis, if controlling stockhold-
ers can demonstrate that they made a business decision on an informed basis, in
good faith and without self-interest, the courts will respect the decision without
holding the controlling person liable for unanticipated losses.78 The business
judgment rule in the freeze-out merger context contemplates deferential judicial
examination of the substance of the controlling stockholder's decision, while fo-
cusing on the process the controlling person used in consummating the transac-
tion.79
The duty of loyalty is perhaps more critical in the controlling stock-
holder buyout context. Where a controlling stockholder receives a direct or
indirect personal benefit from a business decision or transaction, this may sug-
gest a breach of the duty of loyalty. 80 Such self-dealing obviates the controlling
stockholder's business judgment rule defense.8 In the controlling stockholder
buyout context, the controlling stockholder, by definition, stands on both sides
of the transaction.82 Controlling persons are able to propose the transaction, set
the terms, and ultimately approve the transactions with their voting power.83
78 See supra note 2.
79 In response to the seminal business judgment rule case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985), where the court found a breach of the duty of care, the Delaware state legislature
enacted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). This section allows Delaware corporations to
limit or eliminate director liability for duty of care breaches. Charter or bylaw provisions, how-
ever, cannot limit personal liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty. See id. § 102(b).
80 The duty of loyalty contemplates a duty of candor or duty to disclose. This ancillary duty
requires that a director disclose any potential conflicts of interest that the director may have with
respect to any corporate matter on which the director will act. This duty applies to facts and cir-
cumstances that "would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder." Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976)). Recently, in Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530
(Del. Ch. 2000), the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a shareholder summary judgment motion
where the directors provided the shareholders with cursory information that was considered mate-
rial to merger approval. Id. at 541. Because the directors failed to provide the shareholders with
sufficient financial information indicating why the merger was in their best interest, the court held
they "defaulted on [their] affirmative obligation to disclose the information material to the deci-
sions [they] [were] asking the GenDerm stockholders to make." Id. at 532.
s See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (holding that if a
self-dealing fiduciary cannot demonstrate that the transaction was at an entirely fair price, the
fiduciary will be liable and there is no business judgment defense); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). A self-dealing transaction or decision is
when the controlling stockholders transact when they have "a personal interest that might conflict
with the interest of the party to whom she owes a fiduciary duty." JAMES E. CLAPP, WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 391 (2000). A self-dealing transaction can be sanitized if the "taint" of
the underlying conflict transaction is removed by demonstrating that the transaction was approved
by shareholders or by disinterested directors who were fully informed of the conflict. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
82 See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 115 (Del. 1994).
83 See id. at 1116.
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The extensive role of the controlling stockholder in this process has impressed
upon the courts the need for stricter scrutiny of these transactions.84 This strict
scrutiny is embodied in the rigorous entire fairness standard of review.
B. Entire Fairness Review
The exacting entire fairness standard has proven to be an important pro-
cedural vehicle of minority stockholder protection under Delaware law.85 Since
the seminal 1983 case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,86 controlling stockholders
seeking to freeze out the minority bear the burden of proving the entire fairness
of the transaction. In Weinberger, directors who served on the boards of both
the parent and subsidiary sought to buy out the minority interest at twenty-one
dollars per share. 87 Plaintiff-stockholders challenged the elimination of the de-
fendant corporation's minority shareholders by a freeze-out merger between the
defendant corporation and its majority owner.88 The Delaware Court of Chan-
cery held that the terms of the merger were fair to plaintiff and the other minor-
ity shareholders of the defendant corporation.89
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the transaction failed
to satisfy any reasonable concept of "fair dealing."90 This was due in part to the
deficient disclosure of the defendant's directors' conflicts of interest.9' Addi-
84 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996).
85 While entire fairness has been an important procedural remedy, appraisal has also played an
important role in protecting stockholders who are frozen out. Appraisal is a legislative creation
that allows stockholders who are discontent with a transaction to sell their stock at a fair price
determined by a court. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988).
Legislatures instituted this remedy to compensate for the abrogation of the common law right each
stockholder had to prevent the consummation of the merger. See Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959). For a comprehensive discussion of the statutory appraisal rights
of shareholders in the freeze-out context, see Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware's Going Pri-
vate Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and
Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus. LAW. 519 (2003); Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in from the
Cold: Reforming Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Freeze-out Transactions, 1997 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 133; Michael R. Schwenk, Note, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 649 (1994).
86 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
87 Id. at 707.
88 Id. at 703.
89 Id. In doing so, the court rejected the "Delaware Block" method of determining fair value
in any stock valuation proceeding under Delaware law. See id. at 712-13. Under the Block
method, traditional asset value, market value, and earnings value were each assigned a specific
weight and the amounts were added to create a per share value. See id. at 713. The court felt the
method was "outmoded" in that it excluded valuation methods that were prevalent in the financial
community at the time. Id. at 712-13.
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tionally, the minority shareholders were denied critical information, subse-
quently resulting in an uninformed minority shareholder vote.
92
The Weinberger court elaborated on the central aspects of the entire
fairness standard. The court stated,
[T]he concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and
fair price. The former embraces questions of when the transac-
tion was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, dis-
closed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fair-
ness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market
value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that
affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.
However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between
fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be exam-
ined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
However, in a non-fraudulent transaction price may be the pre-
ponderant consideration outweighing other features of the
merger.93
Underlying the Weinberger court's entire fairness framework is the existence of
conflicts of interest created by the controlling stockholders controlling both
sides of the transaction - establishing the terms and voting in approval.94 This
conflict is precisely what obliges controlling stockholders to demonstrate the
transaction was entirely fair.95 Since Weinberger, Delaware courts have subse-
quently refined the "fair dealing" and "fair price" requirements of the entire
fairness standard.96
While "fair price" was said to examine the economic and financial consid-
erations relied upon when valuing the proposed purchase, the courts elaborated
on what the fair price determination did not entail. In Cinerama, Inc. v. Techni-
color, Inc. 97 the Delaware Court of Chancery opined that the fair price determi-
nation
does not mean the highest price financeable or the highest price
that fiduciary could afford to pay. At least in the non-self-
dealing context, it means a price that is one that a reasonable
92 See id.
93 Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
94 See id. at 710.
95 See id.
96 See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
97 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
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seller, under all the circumstances, would regard as within a
range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably ac-
cept.98
The fair dealing prong of the analysis examines "the process itself that the board
followed, the quality of the result it achieved and the quality of the disclosures
made to the shareholders to allow them to exercise such choice as the circum-
stances could provide."99
An important corollary of the fair dealing requirement is the "complete
candor" requirement set forth in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.1° ° In Lynch,
minority stockholders tendered their shares in response to an offer between de-
fendant corporations to purchase outstanding common stock.' 0' The minority
stockholder filed suit against the directors and corporations, alleging violations
of their fiduciary duties by failing to make full disclosure in the tender offer
regarding the value of net assets. 0 2 Further, the minority shareholders alleged
that they were coerced into selling their shares for a grossly inadequate price.1
0 3
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the failure to disclose the substance of
an engineering report was a violation of the fiduciary duty of candor owed by
defendants to the minority shareholders.'°4 The court further held that minority
shareholders had the right to that information and to make their own judgments
about its significance before they were asked to tender their shares.1
0 5
The complete candor requirement established in Lynch charges Dela-
ware courts with an obligation to
examine what information defendants had and to measure it
against what they gave to the minority stockholders, in a con-
text in which "complete candor" is required. In other words,
the limited function of the Court [is] to determine whether de-
fendants had disclosed all information in their possession ger-
mane to the transaction in issue. And by "germane" we mean,
for present purposes, information such as a reasonable share-
98 Id. at 1143. For a discussion of the different valuation methodologies employed by state
courts in fair price hearings, see generally LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.07 discussing
going concern value, earnings value, liquidation value, and net book value.
99 Cinerama, 663 A.2d. at 1140.
100 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
to Id. at 279.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 281.
105 Id. at 282.
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holder would consider important in deciding whether to sell or
retain stock.'
0 6
The court noted that the duty of candor owed to a minority stockholder is essen-
tial because it prevents controlling persons from using their presumable infor-
mational advantages to their own advantage and to the detriment of the minority
stockholders.10 7
While entire fairness review was generally invoked to critically assess
the controlling stockholder's dealings in interested mergers, the effect, from a
judicial review standpoint, of conditioning consummation of the transaction on
approval by a majority of the minority of the stockholders and/or the approval
vote of a special committee of disinterested directors was not, and is still not
certain. There was the notion that these mechanisms would change the standard
from entire fairness to business judgment, while other authority suggested the
standard would remain the same subject to the burden shifting to the plaintiff to
prove the unfairness of the transaction. This issue was brought to the forefront
in diverging cases of In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
108
and Citron v. EL Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 'o9
C. The Pre-Kahn Split of Authority
Before the Delaware Supreme Court decided Kahn v. Lynch Communi-
cation Systems,' 1o lower courts were divided over what effect, if any, should be
given to intra-corporate cleansing mechanisms in interested mergers. In Trans
World Airlines,"' the minority shareholders of Trans World Airlines ("TWA"),
voted by an overwhelming majority to approve a proposed merger transaction
by which entities controlled by TWA's dominating shareholder, Carl Icahn,
would acquire all of the voting stock of the corporation." 2 In the proposed
merger, each share owned by the shareholders would be converted into the right
to receive $20 per share in cash and $30 in principal amount of a new 12% sub-
106 Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
107 See id. For a discussion of the informational advantages and how controlling persons poten-
tially use them to the detriment of minority stockholders, see generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK &
MARCEL KAHAN, THE "LEMONS EFFECT" IN CORPORATE FREEZE-OUTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. w6938, 1999), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6938.pdf.
108 No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 870 (1988).
109 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
110 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
111 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 870 (1988).
112 Id. at *2. Excepted from the ownership was a 10% stock interest that was to be owned by
an Employee Stock Ownership Plan.
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ordinated debenture due in 2008.1 13 Icahn, who controlled 77% of TWA's
common stock, committed to vote his shares in the same proportion as the pub-
lic shares were voted." 14 Over 96% of the voting shares approved the transac-
tion." 5
Several minority stockholders sought a preliminary injunction to stop
the merger on inadequate disclosure and breach of fiduciary duty grounds. 116 In
determining the evidentiary burdens on the parties, the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery held that when a special negotiating committee of disinterested directors is
formed and a merger provision requiring approval by a majority of disinterested
shareholders is present, the business judgment standard of review is invoked. "17
Put another way, the directors are not obligated to prove the entire fairness of
the transaction; rather, the plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that the decision
to enter into the transaction lacked rational business judgment.
Alternatively, a diverging view was developing in Delaware case law.
In Citron,18 Du Pont, the parent company, sought to acquire approximately
30% of its Remington subsidiary." 9 In the merger, Du Pont ultimately acquired
all of Remington's common stock that it did not already own by exchanging
.574 Du Pont share for each share of Remington. 20 The minority stockholder
plaintiffs contended that Du Pont, as Remington's majority shareholder,
breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to Remington's minority shareholders by




116 Id. at *3. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that
(I) the price proposed is unfairly low; (2) that the transaction was timed to
mask the upward trend of TWA's earnings; and (3) that a special two member
committee of the TWA board that purported to represent the interests of the
public shareholders in the negotiation process with Mr. Icahn, (a) misunder-
stood its responsibility to seek to negotiate the best available transaction, (b)
as a result, was passive, and (c) relied entirely upon an investment banker
who, as it knew, had a material conflict of interest, and who never proceeded
with its own analysis of value far enough to reduce its view to a single range
of fair value.
Id. at *2-3.
117 ld. at *"18-19.
118 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990).
119 Id. at 493.
120 Id. at 498.
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would not be in a position to oppose.' 2' Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the
merger was a product of self-dealing, unfair dealing, and gross negligence.1
The court rejected these arguments and ultimately held that the subsidi-
ary stockholder vote approving the merger was fully informed and valid.
2 3
Furthermore, it held that the parent fairly proposed and negotiated the merger
terms with plaintiff stockholders. 24 The merger committee understood its fidu-
ciary obligations, discharged those obligations carefully, and produced a trans-
action that was fair to the minority stockholders.
25
Of important interest is the Citron court's discussion regarding what
standard of review should be applied to the conflict transaction. As in the TWA
merger, the parent-subsidiary merger in Citron contained a minority of the ma-
jority provision as well as a special committee of disinterested directors. 26 The
court reiterated the Weinberger mantra that "[tlo invoke the entire fairness re-
view standard, all that is required is that the parent corporation has stood on
both sides of the transaction."' 127 Citing to Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co." 28 the
court held that because "the merger was ratified by a fully informed majority of
Remington's minority stockholders . . . ,the burden will shift to the plaintiff to
prove that the merger was unfair."'' 29 The court refused to follow the case law
suggesting the invocation of business judgment review in this context. 130
The underlying rationale for the Citron court's refusal to alter the stan-
dard of review is compelling. In a merger between a controlling stockholder
and the corporation it controls, "no court could be certain whether the transac-
tion terms fully approximate what truly independent parties would have
achieved in an arm's length negotiation" notwithstanding the negotiations of
special committees of independent directors.' 3' Even with a special committee
and ratification of the merger by a majority of the minority shareholders, the
court felt additional protection for minority stockholders was necessary. The
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 503.
124 Id. at 505.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 498.
127 Id. at 500 n. 13.
128 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985).
129 Citron, 584 A.2d at 500 (citation omitted).
130 See id. at 501. "Rather, in a parent-subsidiary merger context, shareholder ratification oper-
ates only to shift the burden of persuasion, not to change the substantive standard of review (entire
fairness). Nor does the fact that the merger was negotiated by a committee of independent, disin-
terested directors alter the review standard." Id. at 502.
131 Id. at 502.
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court provided this protection by adhering to the rigorous entire fairness stan-
dard and staunchly refusing to dilute the review process. The bi-polar outcomes
reached in Trans World Airlines and Citron were resolved in the seminal Kahn
v. Lynch Communication Systems 32 case.
D. Kahn and its Progeny
The Delaware Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the seemingly con-
tradicting authority in Citron, Rosenblatt, and Trans World Airlines. In Kahn,
43.3% controlling stockholder, Alcatel, sought to acquire the remaining out-
standing common equity interest in Lynch Communications. 33 In response to
previous resistance from Lynch's management to acquire a subsidiary of Al-
catel, Alcatel attempted to purchase the outstanding 56.7% of shares in Lynch
that it did not own.' 4 Pursuant to a supermajority provision, Alcatel previously
thwarted two corporate combination attempts by Lynch. 35 By virtue of the vot-
ing provision, any combination necessarily required Alcatel's approval.
In response to a $14 per share offer from Alcatel, Lynch's directors ap-
pointed a special committee of independent directors to assess the merits of the
offer. 36 The committee considered the bid to be inadequate and instead sought
$17 per share. 137 After raising the price to $15.50, Alcatel decided to launch a
hostile offer for that amount. 38 With no other option, the directors ceded to the
demands of Alcatel and approved the sale at a per share price of $15.50.139
Subsequently, minority shareholders filed suit alleging that defendants
breached their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. Plaintiffs contended that the
Chancery Court erred when it found that "the tender offer and merger were ne-
gotiated by an independent committee" and then placed the burden of persua-
sion on plaintiffs. 40 Plaintiffs further alleged that the merger price was unfair
and Alcatel's offer to purchase the stock was false and misleading.' 4' The
Delaware Supreme Court held that the hostile offer launched by Alcatel under-
132 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
133 Id. at 1112.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1113. The court deemed this important to its finding that Alcatel did, as a matter of
fact, control the corporation.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1118.
138 Id. at 1119.
139 Id. at 1113.
140 Id. at 1112.
141 Id. at 1112.
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mined the authority of the special committee.142 Any authority to "say no" was
abrogated by the threat of the hostile offer. 43 Thus, the court held "[e]ntire fair-
ness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis ... irrespective of whether the
burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away from the controlling or domi-
nating shareholder, because the unchanging nature of the underlying 'interested'
transaction requires careful scrutiny.'" 44
The court then qualified this framework by crafting a two-part test for
determining whether burden shifting is appropriate in an interested merger
transaction. 145 In the freeze-out context, the controlling shareholder proposing
the transaction bears the burden of proving its entire fairness. If the controlling
stockholder does not dictate the terms of the merger and the special committee
has genuine bargaining power that it can exercise with the controlling stock-
holder at arm's length, the burden of proof will be shifted. 146 The stringent bur-
den will then be shifted to the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of the transac-
tion. 147 The effect of this analysis was to provide incentives to transacting par-
ties in the freeze-out context to employ special committees and include majority
of the minority provisions ex ante, as these minority stockholder protections
would facilitate the controlling person's defense in ex post merger review.
What is clear from the Kahn analysis is that the use of these "intra-
corporate cleansing mechanisms" does not ipso facto establish the procedural
fairness of the conflict transaction. 48 Furthermore, as Kahn expressly suggested
by reaffirming Weinberger and Rosenblatt, the correct standard of review in
142 Id. at 1120.
143 Id. The court explained that the
"power to say no is a significant power. It is the duty of directors serving on
an independent committee to approve only a transaction that is in the best in-
terests of the public shareholders, to say no to any transaction that is not fair to
those shareholders and is not the best transaction available. It is not sufficient
for such directors to achieve the best price that a fiduciary will pay if that
price is not a fair price."
Id. at 1119 (citation omitted).
144 Id. at 1116. For a discussion on the effect of this protection on the dispersed ownership
structure of corporations, see Georgakopoulos, supra note 9, at 43.
145 See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117.
146 Note, however, that a condition precedent to burden shifting is a factual finding that the
special committee was genuinely independent, informed, and had the ability to negotiate at arm's
length. See id. at 1120.
147 See id. For a discussion on the burden of proving unfairness, see Park McGinty, The Twi-
light of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proce-
duralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 235 n. 185 (1997).
148 Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1120. For a discussion of the effect of this holding on the statutory ap-
praisal remedy, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can
Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 360, 389-90 (1996).
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interested mergers is entire fairness and not business judgment. This framework
was undermined in the context of a controlling stockholder tender offer to the
minority in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.1
49
E. Diverging Standard: Tender Offers and the Solomon Line of Cases
The Delaware courts have treated tender offers by controlling stock-
holders differently than negotiated mergers. While the tender offer and the ne-
gotiated merger essentially accomplish the same goal when commenced by a
controlling shareholder, there has been recent commentary questioning the dif-
ferent treatment of transactional similarities. 50 Moreover, several recent cases
adhering to the Solomon framework have solidified the less stringent judicial
treatment of tender offers by controlling stockholders.' 5'
In Solomon, minority stockholders challenged the fairness of a tender
offer made by Credit Lyonnais Banque Nederland N.V. ("CLBN") to purchase
5.9 million shares of the publicly traded common stock of Pathe Communica-
tions Corporation ("Pathe"). 52 CLBN, an 89% stockholder, launched a tender
offer to buy out the remaining 11% minority. 153 The tender offer was proposed
in conjunction with CLBN's planned foreclosure on a security interest it held. 54
The minority stockholders asserted that the directors breached their duty of fair
dealing because they failed to oppose the tender offer. 55 Furthermore, plaintiffs
claimed the directors breached their duty of care for negligently failing to nego-
tiate a sufficient tender price. 
56
In a succinct opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when
courts examine "totally voluntary tender offers," such as the one in Solomon,
"they do not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular
price." 57 The court reiterated and affirmed the "voluntariness" standard Dela-
149 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
150 See Allen et al., supra note 16, at 879-80.
151 See, e.g., In re Aquila, Inc. S'holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002) (refusing to
enjoin tender offer on grounds that such offers were voluntary transactions and holding that no
fairness duty is to be imposed on parent companies); In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (involving a challenge of an exchange offer by
a controlling stockholder of Siliconix).





157 Id. at 39 (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 576 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977)). The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on proce-
dural grounds, namely for failing to state a cause of action for a breach of the duty of care because
it made only conclusory assertions and because there was no right to receive a particular price for
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ware courts have applied to tender offers, namely "whether coercion is present
or whether there is 'materially false or misleading disclosures made to share-
holders in connection with the offer."' 158 Ultimately, the court concluded that in
the absence of coercion or disclosure violations, the adequacy of the price in a
voluntary tender offer is not an issue.
159
More recently, in In re Aquila, Inc. Shareholders Litigation'60 and in In
re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,166 the Chancery Court affirmed the
principles expressed in Solomon. The facts of both cases are virtually the same.
In Siliconix, the controlling stockholder parent company, Vishay International
("Vishay"), launched a cash tender offer of $28.82 to acquire the outstanding
19.6% minority interest of its subsidiary. 62 Vishay agreed to pursue a second
step short-form merger under section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law163 at the same price if it acquired at least 90% of the outstanding Siliconix
shares. 164 At the request of Vishay, Siliconix appointed a special committee of
disinterested directors who subsequently sought financial advice regarding the
adequacy of Vishay's offer. 65 After negotiations with the special committee
failed, Vishay unilaterally launched an exchange offer with a majority of the
minority provision.166 The Siliconix special committee neither recommended
nor rejected the offer. 167
A minority stockholder of Siliconix filed suit to enjoin the exchange of-
fer on the grounds that Vishay could not demonstrate that the transaction was
entirely fair. 68 The court held, notwithstanding the "conflicted status" of a ma-
jority of the directors of Siliconix, "unless coercion or disclosure violations can
be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate the entire fairness of [a]
proposed tender transaction."'169  In both Aquila and Siliconix the Delaware
totally voluntary tender offers. Id. at 40.
158 Id. at 39 (citing Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch.
1987)).
159 Id.
160 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002).
161 No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
162 Id. at *2.
163 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
164 Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *2.
165 Id.
166 Id. at *4.
167 Id. at *17.
168 Id. at *3.
169 Id. at *7 (citing In re Life Technologies, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16513, 1998 WL
1812280 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998)).
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courts refused to apply entire fairness scrutiny to tender offers,1 70 notwithstand-
ing its application to negotiated mergers that achieve the identical result for the
controlling party.
A recently settled case in the Delaware Court of Chancery, Hartley v.
Peapod, Inc., 17 1 sheds light on the scope of Siliconix and Aquila. In Hartley,
Vice-Chancellor Lamb, in the context of a proposed class action settlement,
addressed issues relating to tender offers commenced by controlling stockhold-
ers. In Harley, the controlling stockholder, Koninklijke Ahold N.V. ("Ahold"),
entered into a merger agreement with the Peapod Corporation to acquire the
remaining outstanding stock. 172 After intense negotiations between Ahold and
the minority stockholders' special committee, Ahold agreed to offer $2.15 per
share. 173 The transaction was structured as a tender offer followed by a second-
step short-form merger. 174 Ahold and the special committee negotiated a merger
agreement stating the terms and conditions of the offer., 75 The tender offer was
not subject to a majority of the minority provision. As a result, even if no mi-
nority stockholders tendered into the offer, Ahold still intended to consummate
the merger.
During the settlement hearing, plaintiff sought to justify the existing set-
tlement on the basis that it would have been precluded from challenging the
fairness of the tender offer price, given the recent Siliconix and Aquila hold-
ings. 176 The plaintiff further contended that all the tendering stockholders did so
with full disclosure by Ahold and that the Peapod board agreed to merge with
Ahold. 177 Consequently, the tender offer would surely have been considered
voluntary ex post. Vice-Chancellor Lamb disagreed with plaintiff's contention
and explained that the Aquila and Siliconix holdings were not applicable to
Hartley. 1
78
The Hartley case was distinguished from Siliconix and Aquila in that the
tender offer was the first step of a two-step negotiated merger agreement be-
tween Ahold, the controlling stockholder, and a special committee of the board
170 See id.
171 Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement, Hartley v. Peapod, Inc., No. 19025 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(order approving proposed settlement entered March 8, 2002).
172 Id. at 2-3.
173 Id. at 3.
174 See id.; Clifford E. Neimeth, Mergers & Acquisitions, J. INV. COMPLIANCE, Winter
2002/2003, at 29, 33.
175 Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement at 3.





Levy: Freeze-out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymme
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of directors of Peapod.179 As the Vice-Chancellor opined, "[a]bout this whole
idea that this is a Siliconix transaction. It's not. It's a negotiated transaction
between a majority stockholder and a special committee .... ,,180 Since there
was no majority of the minority provision in the merger agreement, the minority
stockholders would not have been able to stop the transaction. The Vice-
Chancellor noted that this case "was entirely different than Siliconix or Aquila
where the transaction is entirely up to the minority acting as a block or a major-
ity of them to determine whether the transaction will go forward at all."' 8'
Vice-Chancellor Lamb concluded that the transactional mechanics in
Hartley, were the functional equivalent of negotiated mergers by controlling
stockholders and special committees - mergers that are governed by the entire
fairness standard under Kahn.182 The Hartley case serves as a reminder that the
very existence of a merger agreement - which enabled Ahold to consummate a
section 251 long-form merger even if the tender offer was unsuccessful - was
dispositive.
Similarly, in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. ,183 the Delaware
Supreme Court addressed the uncertain question regarding whether a section
253 short-form merger with a controlling stockholder with its 90% owned sub-
sidiary would be subject to entire fairness review. Section 253 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law authorizes directors of a corporation that owns at least
90% of each of the outstanding classes of stock of a subsidiary that are entitled
to vote on a merger, to merge the subsidiary into itself without any requirement
for action to be taken by the board of directors of the subsidiary. 84 Plaintiffs,
relying on the Weinberger and Kahn line of cases, challenged the fairness of the
merger, arguing that mergers effected under section 253 should be reviewed
under the entire fairness test - the same standard that is typically applied to
freeze-out mergers effected by controlling stockholders under the long-form
merger statutes, sections 251 and 252 respectively.
85
The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that section 253 creates a right
in a 90% stockholder to freeze out minority stockholders. This statutory right
"authorizes the elimination of minority stockholders by a summary process that
does not involve the 'fair dealing' component of entire fairness.' 86 Thus, the
179 Id.
180 Id. at 40 n.26 (citing Hearing Transcript at 5, Hartley (No. 19025)).
181 Id. at 40 n.27 (citing Hearing Transcript at 5, Hartley (No. 19025)).
182 See id. at 33. Indeed, Kahn also involved a merger agreement providing for a front-end
loaded tender offer followed by a second-step merger. See 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
183 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
194 Id. at 243; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
185 Unocal Exploration, 777 A.2d at 247.
186 Id. at 247-48 (citations omitted). The court further elaborated:
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short-form merger "effectively circumscribe[s] the parent corporation's obliga-
tions to the minority in a short-form merger."' 8 7 Consequently, the court held
the business judgment rule would be applied when a short-form merger is con-
summated. 
88
When read together, Siliconix and Unocal Exploration provide control-
ling stockholders with a roadmap for accomplishing a freeze-out of the minority
without assuming the formidable burden of proving entire fairness. Moreover,
the Siliconix court engaged in a discussion regarding the incongruence in the
Delaware precedent that requires entire fairness review of interested mergers
and alternatively, business judgment review to tender offers initiated unilaterally
by controlling stockholders. 8 9 This incongruence was a central component of
the Pure Resources opinion.
IV. THE PURE RESOURCES STANDARD
In Pure Resources, Vice-Chancellor Strine delivered an opinion that es-
sentially illustrated the means for controlling stockholders to structure minority
freeze-outs and simultaneously avoid entire fairness litigation. The Vice-
Chancellor attempted to reconcile Delaware's seemingly disparate treatment of
negotiated mergers and tender offers followed by second-step mergers. As was
discussed, under the Kahn benchmark, negotiated mergers by controlling stock-
holders are subject to entire fairness review. 90 Under the Solomon framework
amplified by the Siliconix and Aquila holdings, a unilateral tender offer that
serves the same purpose as the negotiated merger, namely to facilitate the con-
trolling person's purchase of all outstanding common equity interests, would be
Under settled principles, a parent corporation and its directors undertaking a
short-form merger are self-dealing fiduciaries who should be required to es-
tablish entire fairness, including fair dealing and fair price. The problem is
that § 253 authorizes a summary procedure that is inconsistent with any rea-
sonable notion of fair dealing .... The equitable claim plainly conflicts with
the statute. If a corporate fiduciary follows the truncated process authorized by
§ 253, it will not be able to establish the fair dealing prong of entire fair-
ness.... In order to serve its purpose, § 253 must be construed to obviate the
requirement to establish entire fairness.
Id. at 243. For a comprehensive discussion on the foundations of Siliconix and Unocal Explora-
tion and the appraisal remedy, see generally Aronstam et al., supra note 85, at 536-48, arguing for
an alternative "limited fairness" test to short-form merger transactions that would require control-
ling stockholders to demonstrate how the price was arrived at and whether the transaction takes
advantage of the minority stockholders.
187 Unocal Exploration, 777A.2d at 243.
188 Id.
189 See In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
190 See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
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subject to less stringent business judgment review.' 91 This Part will analyze the
Pure Resources decision focusing primarily on the judicial asymmetry in the
review of controlling stockholder tender offers and negotiated mergers.
A. Background and Underlying Negotiations
In 2000, Unocal Corporation, Inc. ("Unocal"), a natural gas and explo-
ration company, spun off its oil operations in western Texas and combined them
with Titan Exploration, Inc., another oil company, to create Pure Resources.
92
Subsequently, Unocal held 65% of Pure Resources outstanding common
stock.193 The former shareholders of Titan Exploration, including several of its
managers that remained to manage Pure Resources, held 34% of the residual
outstanding common stock. 194 With the permission of Pure Resources' man-
agement, in August of 2001, Unocal began investigating the prospect of acquir-
ing the 34% minority interests.195 In August of 2002, Unocal informed the Pure
Resources board of directors of its intent to commence an exchange offer for the
34% remaining minority interest.
96
After learning of Unocal's intent to commence a tender offer, the Pure
Resources board established a special committee that was comprised of a joint-
appointee and one Unocal appointee who possessed no ties to Unocal. 197 This
committee had the limited authority to engage independent advisors, advise the
shareholders with respect to the offer in the required Schedule 14D-9, and nego-
tiate the bid price with Unocal. 98 Unocal refused the special committee's re-
quest that it be delegated plenary authority of the board under Delaware law,
which would have empowered the conmiittee, inter alia, to pursue alternative
transactions and to adopt a poison pill to block the offer. 199
Subsequent to the committee's formation, Unocal formally commenced
an exchange offer. The offer terms contained an exchange ratio of 0.6527 of a
Unocal share for each Pure Resources share. The parties also included a non-
waiveable majority of the minority provision, a waiveable condition that Unocal
would obtain 90% of the outstanding common stock to enable a second-step
191 See supra notes 150-82 and accompanying text.
192 See In re Pure Res. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 425 (Del. Ch. 2002).
193 Id. at 426. The court spent considerable time unraveling the various agreements that were
economically affected by the buyout transaction.
194 Id. at 425.
195 ld. at 427.
196 Id. at 429.
197 ld.
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merger, and a statement of Unocal's intent to consummate a second-step merger
at the same exchange ratio as the exchange offer.200 The special committee op-
posed the offer on the ground that the price was inadequate. 20
The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, sought to enjoin Unocal from
making an exchange offer on several grounds. First, the plaintiff argued that
Unocal's offer was coercive and further subject to entire fairness review under
the Kahn framework.20 2 Additionally, plaintiff alleged that the disclosure
documents filed with the SEC did not provide minority stockholders with ade-
quate disclosure of the material facts and financial information that was neces-
sary for the stockholders to make an informed decision with respect to the ex-
change offer.20 3 Unocal responded that, because it proceeded by way of an ex-
change offer and not a negotiated merger, its offer was subject to the standard
under Solomon and its progeny. 204 To wit, Unocal's offer complied with the
Solomon standard because the terms contained a majority of the minority provi-
sion and further Unocal intended to consummate a short-form merger with the
minority shareholders receiving the same consideration as tendering stockhold-
ers in the first step.205 In a lengthy opinion Vice-Chancellor Strine attempted to
address the underlying dispute - a dispute fraught with doctrinal tension.
B. The Modification of the Solomon Standard
The court began its discussion by articulating the different routes trans-
acting parties can pursue in consummating a buyout of the minority interests. In
a negotiated merger, the court discussed the presence of "inherent coercion" as
articulated in Kahn.2 °6 This inherent coercion that persists when a controlling
stockholder purports to buy out the minority's stock via negotiated merger re-
sults from a fear that the controlling person will make retributive threats against
the minority if they refuse to tender their stock.20 7 Such threats include the
prospect of threatening a squeeze-out merger at a less favorable price, withhold-
ing of dividends, and other retaliatory actions that could potentially influence
the minority's vote.208 The court noted the Kahn mandate of entire fairness re-
view in such situations, while at the same time noting the business judgment
200 Id.
201 Id. at 432.
202 Id. at 433.
203 Id. at 432.
204 Id. at 433.
205 See id.
206 Id. at 433.
207 See id.
208 See id. (citing Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994)).
2004]
33
Levy: Freeze-out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymme
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
review of tender offers under Solomon - despite the prospect of inherent coer-
cion in the latter transactional method as well.
After engaging in a lengthy discussion with respect to the Kahn and
Solomon asymmetry, the Vice-Chancellor refused to apply entire fairness review
and concomitantly established standards for tender offers to be deemed nonco-
ercive. 210 First, the tender or exchange offer should be subject to a nonwaive-
able condition that a majority of the shares not owned by the controlling stock-
holder must be tendered. 21 It is important to note, however, that the court em-
phasized that the definition of minority should be expressly defined to exclude
shareholders who are connected to the controlling stockholder because they are
directors, officers, or affiliates of the controlling stockholder.21 2 Additionally,
stockholders who have economic incentives by virtue of employment agree-
ments, stock repurchase agreements, severance agreements, or any agreement
that would be affected by the transaction should also be excluded.21 3 In this
regard, the court concluded that Unocal's offer was coercive because included
within the definition of "minority" were several stockholders that were affiliated
with Unocal by virtue of employment, severance, or put agreements.24
The second factor requires the offer to contain a promise by the control-
ling stockholder to promptly consummate a short-form merger at the same price
as the exchange or tender offer if it obtains more than 90% of the minority's
stock.21 5 Lastly, the court warned that controlling stockholders must be cautious
not to make any retributive threats against minority stockholders in an attempt to
induce them into tendering their stock.21 6 Thus, if a tender or exchange offer is
"structured in a manner that reduces the distorting effect of the tendering proc-
ess on free stockholder choice and by ensuring minority stockholders a candid
and unfettered tendering recommendation from the independent directors of the
target board" entire fairness review could be evaded.21 7
The court further noted in dicta that business judgment protections, not
the entire fairness standard, should govern negotiated mergers that are negoti-
ated by special committees and contain a majority of the minority provision, but
the court noted such a decision would have to be made by the Delaware Su-
preme Court. This method of analysis, according to the court, "would help level
209 Id. at 438.
210 Id. at 445.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 446.
213 See id.
214 Id. The offer was enjoined subject to amendment of this* aspect of the exchange offer terms.
215 See id. at 445.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 424.
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the litigation risks posed by the different acquisition methods, and thereby pro-
vide an incentive to use the negotiated merger route. ' '21 8 The court essentially
attempted to restore shareholder confidence in the special committee, a confi-
dence that contravenes the inherent suspicions articulated in the Kahn frame-
work. This departure from Kahn will be discussed shortly.
C. The "Fair Summary" Requirement
Essential to Pure Resources is the overall framework it established re-
garding the treatment of minority shareholders in freeze-outs. Along these lines,
the court addressed a question of law that has always been uncertain, namely,
what extent of disclosure is the controlling party required to provide to the mi-
nority. The court advocated for the removal of the substantive protective layer
(entire fairness review) and strengthened the disclosure to minority shareholders
by requiring the controlling party to provide a "fair summary" of investment
banking analyses. For the court, this additional "fair summary" will protect mi-
nority interests and produce a more informed decision. Protecting minority
shareholders by way of mandating additional disclosure, however, is inadequate
because disclosure does not ensure fair dealing - a component that is quintes-
sential to the entire fairness brand of scrutiny.
In addressing the inadequate disclosure claims of the minority stock-
holders, the court focused on the registration statement on form S-4 filed by
Unocal with the SEC to support its offer and the Schedule 14D-9 filed in re-
sponse to the offer.219 The extent of which the underlying investment banker
analyses and valuation methods required to be disclosed to stockholders was an
uncertain question under Delaware law. There had been Delaware case law
suggesting that valuation analyses are not material to the stockholder determina-
tion of whether to approve a transaction or exercise appraisal rights.220 Alterna-
tively, other case law suggested that valuation methodologies might indeed be
material.22'
In McMullin v. Beran, 2 plaintiff-minority shareholder filed a putative
class action against ARCHO Chemical, Inc.'s management, alleging breach of
their fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of their company to a third
218 Id. at 444 n.43.
219 Id. at 448.
220 See, e.g., Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (holding that while
investment banker analyses are helpful to stockholders, this information is not "material" as a
matter of law).
221 See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000) (stating that the information pro-
vided to the investment bankers and the valuation methods they employ may indeed be material in
certain circumstances).
222 765 A.2d 910.
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party at the behest of 80% controlling stockholder.223 The importance and pre-
cedential value of McMullin lies in its examination of the fiduciary responsibili-
ties owed by directors to minority shareholders in evaluating a sale proposed by
the controlling stockholders. The court found that the directors owed minority
stockholders fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith in recommending
the sale, notwithstanding the inability of the directors to negotiate or halt the
224sale given the controlling shareholder's majority holding status.
Specifically, the court held that the directors had the duty to act on an
informed basis to independently ascertain and communicate how the merger
consideration compared to the corporation's value as a going concern.225 In
doing so, the court noted that directors are "obliged to disclose with entire can-
dor all material facts concerning the merger, so that the minority stockholders
are able to make an informed decision whether to accept the tender offer price or
to seek judicial remedies such as appraisal or an injunction. 226
The McMullin court also refused to subject shareholders to uncertainties
when a proposal to merge a corporation with a third party is negotiated by its
controlling shareholder. The court refused to allow management to abdicate its
fiduciary obligations by leaving it to the stockholders to approve or disapprove
the merger agreement without directorial guidance. The court emphasized that
[e]ffective representation of the financial interests of the minor-
ity shareholders imposed upon the Chemical Board an affirma-
tive responsibility to protect those minority shareholders' inter-
ests. This responsibility required the Chemical Board to: first,
conduct a critical assessment of the third-party Transaction with
Lyondell that was proposed by the majority shareholder; and
second, make an independent determination whether that trans-
action maximized value for all shareholders. The Chemical Di-
rectors have a duty to fulfill this obligation faithfully and with
due care so that the minority shareholders will be able to make
an informed decision about whether to accept the Lyondell
Transaction tender offer price or to seek an appraisal of their
shares.227
The McMullin court's campaign to safeguard the minority's decisional interests
in the context of a sale negotiated by a controlling stockholder was based on the
223 Id. at 914.
224 Id. at 921-25.
225 Id. at 917.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 920.
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ineluctable fact that the majority shareholder's voting power makes the outcome
a "preordained" conclusion. 28
The Delaware courts reached an inconsistent result in Skeen v. Jo-Ann
Stores, Inc.229 In Skeen, minority stockholders filed an action against board of
directors of House of Fabrics, Inc. ("HOF"), alleging they were not provided
adequate disclosures relating to a merger in which they were frozen out by a
controlling stockholder.230  HOF agreed to be acquired by Fabri-Centers of
America, Inc., in a two-step transaction - a tender offer of the HOF shares at
$4.25 per share followed by a merger at the same price.231 The former minority
shareholders alleged that they were not provided adequate financial information
to determine whether to accept the merger consideration of $4.25 per share or
pursue their statutory appraisal rights.232 The shareholders contended that omit-
ted information would have been important for them to determine how much
value was added between the tender offer and the merger.233 Additionally, the
stockholders claimed the disclosures they were provided with lacked relevant
material financial data.234
The Skeen court began its analysis by stating the definitive often cited
standard governing whether disclosures are material. For a fact to be considered
material "there must be 'a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omit-
ted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable stockholder as having sig-
nificantly altered the total mix of information made available.' ''235 The court
further noted that the plaintiffs are required to provide a basis for the court to
infer that the alleged disclosure deficiencies were material.236 In commencing
an action based on inadequate disclosure, the plaintiffs are required to allege
that "'facts are missing from the [information] statement, identify those facts,
state why they meet the materiality standard and how the omission caused in-
jury.' 237
Strictly adhering to these pleading standards, the Skeen court held that
the defendant directors offered no undisclosed facts concerning the supposed
228 Id. at 919.
229 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000).
230 Id. at 1171.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 1173-74.
233 Id. at 1173.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1172 (quoting Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del.
1997)).
236 Id. at 1173.
237 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Loudon, 700 A.2d at 140).
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plan that would have been critical to the appraisal determination.238 The com-
plaint ultimately failed because plaintiffs neglected to aver facts suggesting that
the undisclosed information was inconsistent with the disclosed information.239
More importantly, as a precedential matter the court refused to provide its im-
primatur on the notion that a summary of the methodologies used and ranges of
values generated by investment bankers in reaching its fairness opinion should
be considered material as a matter of law. 240 After Skeen, investment-banking
methodologies underlying fairness opinions were considered immaterial and
therefore not subject to mandatory disclosure under Delaware law.
In Pure Resources, the court attempted to narrow the doctrinal chasm
resulting from the Skeen and McMullin decisions. Vice-Chancellor Strine de-
clared that
it is time that this ambivalence be resolved in favor of a firm
statement that stockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the
substantive work performed by the investment bankers upon
whose advice the recommendation of their board as to how to
vote on a merger or tender rely.24'
Supporting the court's reconciliation of this murky question, he stated "that dis-
closure of the banker's 'fairness opinion' alone without more provides stock-
holders with nothing other than a conclusion, qualified by a gauze of protective
language designed to insulate the banker from liability. 242 Because the valua-
tion methodologies are what "buttresses the result," the Vice-Chancellor held
that a fair summary requirement was necessary.243
Additionally, the court ordered Unocal to reveal the restrictions that
were placed on the special committee. 244 To this effect, the Vice-Chancellor
stated that "no reasonable reader of the Pure proxy would know that the special
committee sought to have the full power of the Pure board delegated to it - in-
cluding the power to block an offer through a rights plan - and had been re-
buffed., 245 These disclosure mandates contravene the Delaware judiciary's tra-
ditional reluctance to mandate prolix disclosures and overreach into a realm
traditionally reserved for the SEC. Indeed, under SEC rules, Schedule 14D-9
238 Id. at 1174.
239 See id.
240 See id.
241 In re Pure Res. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See id. at 45 1.
245 Id. at 452.
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does not require the inclusion of the financial analyses of the target's investment
bankers.246 Ultimately, the court enjoined the exchange offer pending revisions
to the registration statement and Schedule 14D-9.247
Is enhanced disclosure the proper focus in protecting minority interests
in freeze-outs? Does abrogating entire fairness review in the freeze-out context
in light of heightened disclosure adequately protect the minority shareholders?
Augmented disclosure has been criticized as having little utility in other con-
texts relating to mandated SEC disclosures.248 Several commentators compel-
lingly assert that SEC mandated disclosure to lay-shareholders leads to ineffi-
ciencies, as lay people are not able to understand intricate disclosures and com-
plex transactions.2 49 As one commentator stated, "The SEC overestimates the
average investor's ability to master the complexities of the financial picture of
the typical issuer, and therefore has failed ... to understand that its disclosure
documents can be used effectively only by professionals. 25°
246 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(e)(2)(ii) (2003).
247 Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 452-53.
248 For interesting perspectives on the great debate surrounding the social and economic utility
of SEC-mandated disclosure, see generally RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE
FORMATIVE YEARS (1964); FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939); Alison Grey
Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 311 (1973); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory
and Management Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1199
(1987); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal
Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300 (1961); Laylin K. James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32
MICH. L. REV. 624 (1934); Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National
Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1473 (1986); Robert
L. Knauss, A Re-Appraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607 (1964); Bruce Alan
Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against
Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222 (1971).
249 See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
OF A PURPOSE 14 (1979).
250 Id. With respect to disclosure requirements in company prospectuses, Kripke stated, "The
myth that it is the layman to whom the prospectus is addressed permeates the SEC's concept of
disclosure. It limits the usefulness of disclosure to those who should be its proper objective, the
sophisticated investor and professional through whom information ought to filter down to the
layman." Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 633 (1972). But
cf Panel Discussion, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus.
LAW. 505, 527 (1972) ("With regard to Professor Kripke's obeisance to the so-called experts in
securities investment, one can, I believe, with equal justification oppose his concept of the 'myth
of the informed layman' with the 'myth of the 'expert' expert."'). The so-called "myth of the
Iexpert' expert" theory is premised on the rationale that Kripke's informed layman theory incor-
rectly assumes that only experts can comprehend disclosure filings and all experts understand
disclosure. Id. Therefore, the SEC should direct disclosure to "those persons who are capable of
understanding the transactions being described." Id.
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In relation to minority shareholders who are confronted with informa-
tional disadvantages vis-A-vis the controlling stockholder, the fair summary re-
quirement may prove to be a boon to the minority's decisional interests when
confronted with the prospect of a freeze-out. In the freeze-out context, minority
interests that are confronted with accepting the freeze-out consideration or per-
fecting their appraisal rights will be aided by the fair summary mandate. How-
ever, this enhanced fair summary disclosure requirement alone, or coupled with
the flawed appraisal remedy,25' is not a sufficient exemplar of minority share-
holder protection in the freeze-out context. Enhanced disclosure should compli-
ment rather than substitute entire fairness review in interested transactions.
D. The Practical Effects of Pure Resources on Transacting Parties
252
The Pure Resources decision has several practical consequences.
While the Delaware Supreme Court will ultimately be the final arbiter on the
standard of review question, Pure Resources, Siliconix, and Aquila, collectively,
suggest that a controlling stockholder seeking to buy out the minority will be
able to avoid entire fairness review if the transaction takes the form of a tender
or exchange offer with a properly structured majority of the minority provision
as well as a promise to consummate a short-form merger on the same terms.
Consequently, the negotiated merger route will less likely be used because the
litigation threat in the tender offer context will likely be non-existent.253
Additionally, transacting parties will necessarily have to be more cogni-
zant of appointing a special committee of independent directors and empower-
ing such committee with plenary authority with respect to an offer. In addition
to meeting SEC disclosure requirements, a fair summary of the investment
bankers' analyses and detailed information with respect to the recommendation
(or lack thereof) of the special committee must be provided to the minority
stockholders. While the absence of these devices do not necessarily constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty, compliance with these requirements will undoubtedly
dispel the entire fairness burden on the proponent of the tender offer. This
raises an important question: Is allowing transacting parties to evade fairness
review in this manner sound public policy? After assessing the discussion on
the judicial incongruity in Pure Resources, the answer will be more apparent.
251 The ineffectiveness of the appraisal remedy will be addressed infra at text accompanying
notes 289-295.
252 For a discussion of the corporate governance implications of Pure Resources, see the com-
ments of Judge Tennille in Lessons From Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54
MERCER L. REV. 683, 691 (2003), recorded in the symposium's morning session transcript.
253 For more on the effects Pure Resources, Siliconix, and Unocal Exploration will have on
transacting parties and their counsel, see Aronstam et al., supra note 85, at 521 n.16, referring to
the "'corporate blueprint' resulting from these opinions.
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V. RECONCILING THE JUDICIAL INCONGRUITY
The sixty-two million dollar question was posed by Vice-Chancellor
Strine in Pure Resources: "Is there reason to believe that the tender offer
method of acquisition is more protective of the minority, with the result that less
scrutiny is required than of negotiated mergers with controlling stockhold-
ers? ' 254 While the Delaware Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of this
question, the Vice-Chancellor provided an illuminating discussion.
The Delaware courts have long perceived tender offers as voluntary
noncoercive transactions.255 Unless "materially false or misleading disclosures
were made to the shareholders in connection with the offer" or "by reason of its
terms or the circumstances under which it was made, is wrongfully coercive"
the Delaware courts consider the offer voluntary.256 Alternatively, tender offers
raise concerns of coerciveness as they have been likened to a prisoner's di-
lemma;2 57 they distort choice and create incentive for stockholders to tender into
offers that they may believe are inadequate in order to subsequently avoid a
worse predicament.258
2.4 In re Pure Res. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2002).
255 See Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987).
256 Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1997) (citing Eisenberg,
537 A.2d at 1056).
257 The prisoner's dilemma can be understood from the following hypothetical:
Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank
and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their per-
sonal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecutor
makes the following offer to each. "You may choose to confess or remain si-
lent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges
against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does seri-
ous time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent,
they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convic-
tions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent,
I'll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you
wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomor-
row morning." The "dilemma" faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever
the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the out-
come obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they
would have obtained had both remained silent.
Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Zalta ed. 2003), at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112003/entrieslprisoner-dilemma
(last modified Aug. 11, 2003). This philosophical problem has been applied to tender offers as an
illustration of the conflict between individual shareholders and group rationality.
258 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1039-40 (1982); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and
Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1696-97 (1985); Robert A.
Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense": May
Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 442 (1990).
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The Vice-Chancellor focused on the coercive potential of tender offers
coupled with the same potential for retributive action by the controlling stock-
holders as in negotiated mergers. For the Vice-Chancellor, "nothing about the
tender offer method of corporate acquisition makes the 800-pound gorilla's re-
tributive capabilities less daunting to minority shareholders., 259 Accordingly,
the Vice-Chancellor argued that, ex ante, minority shareholders would fear re-
tributive action ex post if they vote no. This "inherent coercion" exists in both
the tender offer and negotiated merger contexts with equal force. Thus, Strine
was convinced that the disparate treatment of the two transactional methods
under Delaware law is not warranted. Put another way, the substance of a trans-
action should govern how the transaction is reviewed by the court, not the form
or mechanics of it.
Interestingly, there exists a theoretical basis to argue that the disparate
treatment of tender offers and negotiated mergers under Delaware law is inten-
tional. The Siliconix opinion itself acknowledges the intentional nature of the
asymmetrical treatment of the two transaction types.260 Vice-Chancellor Noble
noted that as a policy matter the distinction is appropriate because tender offers
are not transactions that are directed at the target company.26' By definition,
tender offers are made directly to the stockholders and therefore are not corpo-
rate-level transactions.262 Furthermore, unlike in the negotiated merger, the
stock interests of nontendering stockholders do not evaporate as a matter of law
- at least not until the short-form merger is effectuated.263 On the other hand, a
merger is a corporate-level transaction by the board of directors that can be out-
come determinative by the controlling stockholder who has sufficient voting
power.
In adhering to the Solomon/Siliconix business judgment review frame-
work, the Vice-Chancellor proposed a "slight easing" of the Kahn paradigm, for
the purpose of providing incentive to use the negotiated merger route.264 To that
end, he advocated providing business judgment protection to negotiated mergers
where a special committee and majority of the minority provision are present.
Ultimately, for the Vice-Chancellor, affording a "greater liability immunizing
effect" to special committee negotiations and majority of the minority provi-
sions would ease the asymmetrical treatment of tender offers and negotiated
mergers under Delaware law.
265
259 See Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 441.
260 See In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 n.35 (Del. Ch.
June 19, 2001).
261 Id. at *7.
262 Id.
263 See id.
264 Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444 n.43.
265 See id. at 444.
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A. Applying Entire Fairness Review to Both Transaction Types
For Vice-Chancellor Strine, the minor transactional difference should
not heavily impact the policy-driven decision of what standard of review should
be applied to these transactions ex post. In light of the fact that there is some
basis to argue that the incongruence in Delaware's treatment of tender offers and
negotiated mergers is intentional, is a "slight easing" of the Kahn benchmark
appropriate in the negotiated merger context? Should these controlling stock-
holder transactions when accompanied by intra-corporate cleansing mechanisms
be afforded business judgment deference as Vice-Chancellor Strine suggested in
Pure Resources? To answer this important question requires a reassessment of
the underlying policy concerns of the Kahn framework.
In Kahn, the Delaware Supreme Court was principally concerned with
the controlling stockholder's ability to influence a special committee of inde-
pendent directors and minority stockholders. The court expressly stated, "no
court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate what
truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm's length negotia-
tion. ' 26  Often, the only source of advice these committees have is from the
controlling stockholder who is the proponent of the merger.267 The integrity of
the special disinterested director committee process necessarily requires an en-
hanced form of judicial scrutiny as most public corporations have a majority of
independent directors, yet those directors are not hermetically sealed off from
the inside directors.268 These concerns that the Kahn court confronted remain
prevalent in both tender offers and negotiated mergers - when commenced by
controlling stockholders.
Additionally, Kahn was concerned with the ability of a controlling
stockholder to take retaliatory actions in the wake of rejection by an independent
board, a special committee or a minority stockholder.2 69 Vice-Chancellor Strine
argued that this concern is identical if not more prevalent in the tender offer
270context. In a tender offer, a "stockholder could be one of the few who holds
out, leaving herself in an even more thinly traded stock with little hope of li-
quidity and subject to a § 253 merger at a lower price or at the same price but at
a later (and, given the time value of money, a less valuable) time."27'
Beyond Kahn, the controlling stockholder who effectuates a freeze-out
of the minority by way of either a tender offer or a negotiated merger will likely
266 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994).
267 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 453 (1993).
268 See id. at 452.
269 See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116.
270 See Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 442-43.
271 Id. at 442.
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be privy to private information relating to the corporation's value.272 This pres-
ence of private information "enables a controlling stockholder to gain systemati-
cally at the expense of the minority shareholders. 273 Indeed, when the control-
ling stockholder's information indicates that the value of the minority's shares is
above the market price, the profit maximizing controlling stockholder will not
274hesitate to exercise his or her freeze-out right at that very moment.
The controlling stockholder's right to effectuate a freeze-out is therefore
akin to the ultimate call option - a call option on the minority's interest that lasts
for an indefinite duration and whose exercise price is determined by the option
holder.275 Because there are few, if any, cognizable differences between the
Solomon and Kahn line of cases, and because the technical differences do not
adequately account for the differences in policy emphasis, these transactions
should be treated the same way. In light of the prevalence of the concerns of
Kahn in both transaction types, the appropriate judicial response should con-
template the application of the entire fairness standard to both tender offers and
negotiated mergers when the proponent is a controlling person, not the applica-
tion of business judgment protection to the interested proponents of these trans-
actions.
VI. ENTIRE FAIRNESS, FREEZE-OUTS, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
Is the application of entire fairness review costly and economically inef-
ficient so as to warrant abdicating this standard of review in the freeze-out con-
text? Are freeze-out mergers socially optimal transactions? Is substantive re-
view of freeze-out transactions consistent with Delaware's venerable corporate
law model? Is the Delaware Court of Chancery - the court that will engage in
entire fairness review - adequately equipped for handling entire fairness review
expeditiously and efficiently? Addressing these questions is essential in assess-
ing the costs associated with entire fairness review and offsetting these costs
with potential benefits resulting from this brand of scrutiny. Moreover, delving
into the social, economic, and transaction costs associated with freeze-outs will
make it increasingly apparent that entire fairness review is necessary in freeze-
outs - irrespective of whether the transacting parties accomplish the freeze-out
goal via the tender offer or negotiated merger.
272 See id. at 442-43.
273 BEBCHUK & KAHAN, supra note 107, at 4.
274 See id.
275 See, e.g., ZOHAR GOSHEN & ZVI WEINER, THE VALUE OF THE FREEZEOUT OPTION (Berkeley
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A. Transaction Costs, Externalities, and Incentives
Any party seeking judicial relief is certain to incur some form of trans-
action costs. In merger review those transaction costs can be extensive, and
include, inter alia, legal fees, expert fees, lost executive time, and potential risk
minimization on the part of management. When judicial scrutiny is most in-
tense (entire fairness review), management's hands could be tied and elements
of risk, which are part and parcel of corporate notions of wealth maximiza-
276 poenialtion, can potentially be stifled.277 This negative externality is arguably the
most significant cost stemming from strict judicial review when corporate ma-
chinery is the focal point. As one commentator has suggested, "[a] legal regime
that significantly impaired management's freedom to decide the corporation's
regular affairs would destroy far more shareholder value than is destroyed by all
the renegade managements that oppress minority shareholders. 278
276 There has been a longstanding philosophical debate regarding whether shareholder wealth
maximization is the fundamental purpose of the corporation. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al.,
The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1067, 1067 (2002) [hereinafter Allen et al., Great Takeover Debate] ("the question is whether
corporation law exists solely in order to facilitate shareholder economic welfare or whether the
,republican' form of corporate governance represents a partial commitment by the law to values in
addition to implementing shareholder will"). Vice-Chancellors Strine and Jacobs and former
Chancellor William Allen recently crystallized this great debate as follows:
Competing political and philosophic views of the nature and purpose of
the corporation may yield rather different answers to the most basic and ar-
guably most persistent controversy in corporation law: What is the core pur-
pose of the corporation? Is it to achieve the best result for the current group of
stockholders? That position is associated with what we call the "property
model" of the corporation. Or is it to maximize the value that the corporation
generates as an entity in the long term, regardless of whether that is in the best
interests of the current stockholders? That view is associated with what has
been called the "entity model" of the corporation.
The focal point of the ongoing debate between the adherents of these two
schools for most of the last quarter-century has been fixed - almost obses-
sively - on the area of takeover proposals, and specifically, on the question of
who has primacy to decide whether to accept an "all-shares" tender offer -
stockholders or directors? The property modelists, who are viewed as advo-
cates of shareholder choice, contend that the stockholders themselves must be
permitted to accept or reject a tender offer once the directors have had the op-
portunity to negotiate for a higher price, to seek better deals, and to present a
noncoercive alternative. By contrast, the entity modelists regard director deci-
sionmaking as primary. When informed directors have made a good-faith de-
cision that an all-shares tender offer is not in the long-run best interests of the
corporation, this school advocates that directors must be permitted to "just say
no" on the stockholders' behalf.
Id. at 1071-72 (footnotes omitted); see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of
the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1992).
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Alternatively, when courts engage in deferential adjudication (business
judgment review) transactions costs are necessarily diminished as the burden of
proof is on the challenging shareholders. When courts apply deferential review,
directorial discretion is not threatened and management is able to "respond effi-
ciently to a perpetually changing business environment . . . thereby creat[ing]
significant enhanced discretion efficiencies. 2 79  This increased discretion,
which presumably constitutes a positive externality, is due to the rational basis
type of adjudication 280 - if the directorial action is rationally related to a legiti-
mate purpose it will almost always pass judicial scrutiny.
While the costs of entire fairness review can be insidious (and not
merely from a pecuniary perspective) there are several positive externalities that
result from this type of adjudication. 281 The mere potentiality that a freeze-out
merger will face entire fairness review will unavoidably affect the planning and
transactional mechanics of the business transaction. Transacting parties and
their counsel, sentient that entire fairness review is a possibility, will have a
powerful incentive to transact fairly with the minority shareholders. Moreover,
removing entire fairness review potentially subjects minority interests to exploi-
tation on behalf of overly opportunistic controlling persons. Entire fairness re-
view, therefore, hovers over the controlling stockholder as a Sword of Damo-
cles, ensuring fair and reasonable treatment of the minority. It is a facilitator of
279 Id. at 221.
280 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
281 While entire fairness litigation can be costly, it is important to mention the overall institu-
tional effectiveness of the Delaware courts. The Delaware Supreme Court and the Delawre Court
of Chancery collectively have been efficient and effective forums of judicial review. Recently,
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey, expounded on Delaware's
judicial review of corporate transactions:
The disposition rate of the Delaware Courts is rather prompt. The Su-
preme Court moves about ten cases per week. Since the Supreme Court usu-
ally sits in panels of three, this means that each of the five justices must func-
tion on the disposition of one case per day, every day of the year on average.
We are able to average about 30 days from submission to disposition, though
some cases may take 60-90 days, and a few take longer. As you all know, the
Court of Chancery is famous for prompt dispositions and expedited cases. The
foregoing is a glimpse at the quantitative dimension. Now for the qualitative
analysis.
In recent years, over 90% of the business cases disposed of by the Court
of Chancery were not appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. There are
various reasons for that phenomenon (the changing dynamics of individual
corporate transactions, satisfaction with the Chancery decision, delay, costs,
settlement, etc.). Nevertheless, I see it as a tribute to the expertise and prompt
work of this very special trial court that has had a consistently distinguished
record over its 209-year existence.
Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10
U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. I, 4-5 (2002).
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transactions that have a greater potential and likelihood to stray from negotiation
to exploitation.
B. Social Costs of Freeze-out Mergers
This Part will assess the social costs freeze-out mergers exact on soci-
ety. It builds on economic analysis from the literature on freeze-out transactions
and extends some of the theoretical constructs to support the notion of enhanced
scrutiny. If entire fairness review is evadable, freeze-out transactions will likely
become more attractive to controlling shareholders. A legal rule or set of rules
enhancing scrutiny of these transactions may impact the number of freeze-out
transactions undertaken by controlling parties. If freeze-outs do impose social
costs on society, enhancing the scrutiny of these transactions may lead to less
freeze-out incidences which would presumably be socially optimal.
In the absence of market failure, transactions by private parties are said
to be socially optimal, largely because they are consensual. These market trans-
actions are "Pareto improvements because the parties to the transaction value
what they get more than what they have given up. ' '282 Freeze-out mergers are
not considered Pareto optimal because, by definition, the frozen-out minority
shareholders did not consensually transfer their interests to the controlling
283party.   Furthermore, the minority shareholders were better off before they
were frozen out then after the transaction occurred.
Nonconsensual freeze-outs are, to a large extent, unconstrained by legal
rules as a freeze-out option can be exercised at any time for any amount the con-
trolling shareholder chooses to offer. While reputation generally constrains
market actors, in the freeze-out context, reputation only goes so far as to restrict
controlling persons from "extreme forms of expropriation ... and only when
future participation in the capital or labor markets is expected. 284
Since in a good part of these freeze-outs the controlling person will take
the entity private, this reputation concern does not serve as a restriction on the
opportunistic tendencies of the controlling shareholder. Moreover, a controlling
shareholder's good reputation "may have the perverse effect of discouraging the
investigation of or legal challenge to a given conflict transaction, even if the
282 Coates, supra note 7, at 1321. "A situation is said to be Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if
there is no change from that situation that can make someone better off without making someone
else worse off." A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1989).
The concept originated in economist Vilfredo Pareto's famous work, Manuel D'economie
Politique. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (2d ed. 1927).
283 Compare ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12-15 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing the benefits of Pareto optimality), with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 12-17 (5th ed. 1998) (criticizing notions of Pareto efficiency). See also Christopher Avery et.
al, The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 800 (2001) (noting that
the Pareto optimality standard is "notoriously limited in its usefulness, for rarely can one make
some people better off without making even a single person worse off").
284 Coates, supra note 7, at 1322.
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transaction involves a clear wealth transfer from minority shareholders. 285
Consequently, it is evident that there are little, if any, restrictions on these trans-
actions and the recent Delaware case law discussed above seeks to further this
unrestricted scheme, thereby facilitating increased freeze-out incidence.
While freeze-out mergers may not be Pareto efficient, these transactions
may be considered socially optimal under the alterative efficiency model - Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency. Under Kaldor-Hicks, a transaction is socially optimal if it
results in a net increase in utility.286 Thus, while the notion of freeze-outs expro-
priating wealth from minority shareholders in favor of controlling shareholders
leads to sub-optimal Pareto results, under the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, this may
be socially optimal because of the overall increase in wealth - notwithstanding
the potentiality of worsening conditions for the minority.287
Notwithstanding the fact that, under the Kaldor-Hicks theory freeze-
outs should be encouraged, Professor Coates notes that that these transactions
"may reduce social welfare ex post., 288 This social welfare reduction is due to
transaction costs (legal, banking, and printing costs) inherent in all conflict
transactions. Additionally, the ex post social welfare reduction is due to the fact
that "the value taken from minority shareholders may exceed the value received
by the fiduciaries because of differences in valuation due to heterogeneous in-
formation or preferences. 2 89  The costs freeze-outs impose on the minority
shareholders - usually in the form of tax costs and reinvestment costs - are sig-
nificant in warranting enhanced scrutiny.290
If freeze-out transactions yield sub-optimal results in terms of social
welfare and utility, why then does the law tolerate them? Perhaps a per se ban
on these transactions would be more optimal than invoking legal rules that
would constrain these transactions? While some advocate for a general ban on
285 Id. at 1322-23
286 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency posits that an allocation of resources is efficient if the winner's
gains exceed the losses suffered by the losers, thereby making the aggregate better off. See
POSNER, supra note 283, at 14. "A given transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the gainers could
compensate the losers in utiles and all parties would be at least as well off as before the transac-
tion took place." Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 641 (1993).
287 Along these lines, in their famous treatise, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel liken interested transactions to a diversified portfolio where
shareholders "would be on the winning side of some transactions and the losing side of others."
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 22.
288 Coates, supra note 7, at 1324. While Professor Coates' analysis addresses minority dis-
counts in conflict transactions, this Article adapts the economic theory and attempts to apply it to
notions of enhanced scrutiny specifically in freeze-out mergers.
289 id. (citing ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 505-06 (1986)).
290 See, e.g., Bate C. Toms, III, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 569 (1978).
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freeze-outs, 29' economic theorists generally do not adhere to this view. 292 This
is because freeze-outs do indeed have several supporting rationales. For in-
stance, freeze-outs can potentially have the effect of encouraging control per-
sons to devote socially optimal efforts into such projects and investments,293
returning cash for investors to use in more highly valued investments, providing
protection against or alternative to a hostile takeover, and permitting corporate
managers or other shareholders to convert illiquid investments into cash.29
More commonly, freeze-outs "permit a controlling shareholder who
owns 100% of one such asset but only a controlling stake in a second asset to
capture all of the synergies from the combination by first eliminating the minor-
ity owners of the second asset. 295 This capturing of synergistic value coupled
with the rationale contending that freeze-outs are "necessary to the functioning
of the market for corporate control ' 296 leads to results that contravene any notion
of banning freeze-outs altogether. Moreover, while an outright ban on freeze-
outs may minimize self-dealing at the expense of minority shareholders, "addi-
tional transaction costs associated with substitute forms of self-dealing ...
would reduce social gains from the ban. 297
It has been demonstrated that freeze-outs exact both ex ante and ex post
social costs, while concomitantly presenting seemingly sound rationales under-
mining the notion that a per se ban on freeze-outs produces social welfare. Un-
der either the Pareto efficiency model or the Kaldor-Hicks model, freeze-outs
involve wealth transfers that do not seem to increase social welfare and indeed
may have a contra effect. Therefore, while it is not optimal to ban freeze-outs
altogether, it may make economic sense to constrain freeze-outs. Doing so by
enhancing the scrutiny of these transactions will reduce expropriation by the
controlling fiduciary of the minority's wealth. While there is no flawless solu-
tion to this dilemma, a compelling case can be made - based on the social costs
imposed on society by freeze-outs - to reduce the incidence of these transactions
by enhancing judicial scrutiny of them via entire fairness review. Even assum-
ing the incidence of these transactions does not decline, at the very least, en-
hanced scrutiny will serve as an incentive for the fiduciary to deal fairly with
minority shareholders.
291 See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 29, at 1367-70 (advo-
cating a per se ban on pure going private transactions).
292 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 289, at 510-11; Coates, supra note 7, at 1327. See generally
Deutsch, supra note 29.
293 See Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
351, 358 (1996).
294 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 7, § 9.01[2].
295 Coates, supra note 7, at 1327.
296 Id. at 1328.
297 Id. at 1329.
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VII. CONSISTENCY IN DELAWARE'S DOCTRINAL PARADIGM
The negative externality of stifling directorial risk-taking and discretion,
discussed previously, becomes relevant in the context of self-interested transac-
tions. This is where the Delaware corporate law has drawn a proverbial line -
nonconflict transactions enjoy broad discretion while conflict transactions are
constrained by greater scrutiny. Thus, corporate management, by and large,
enjoys unbridled discretion in almost every business transaction or decision they
endorse. Since freeze-outs are by their very nature conflict transactions, they fit
under the enhanced scrutiny side of the divide - a divide that has been central to
the Delaware corporate law paradigm. There is no policy-laden reason to ex-
empt freeze-out transactions from the traditional norms embraced by Delaware's
corporate law model.
Moreover, the Delaware statutory scheme, like most other states, has
shown a general distrust for self-interested transactions.298 Judicial adjudication
is most effective when it consistently aids in the accommodation of legislative
ideals and goals. 299 "Policy development by adjudication is more comfortable
298 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001), Delaware's interested director statute, which reads
as follows:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and I or more of its di-
rectors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, part-
nership, association, or other organization in which I or more of its directors
or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void
or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which au-
thorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such director's or of-
ficer's votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in
good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes
of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested
directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction
is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time
it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a commit-
tee or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the pres-
ence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee
which authorizes the contract or transaction.
299 Allen et al., Great Takeover Debate, supra note 276, at 1070; see also Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205,
1239 (2001). On the role of the Delaware courts in shaping Delaware's corporate law, see gener-
ally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
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when the case at hand requires the jurist to flesh out the details necessary to
create a workable framework to further a policy goal that can be found in the
Delaware General Corporation Law - for example, the need to police self-
dealing. '' 3°° Therefore, applying a heightened standard of review in a conflict
setting would be consistent with the Delaware's legislature's general distrust for
insider opportunism as well as the longstanding common law paradigm the
Delaware courts have articulated over the years.
Additionally, the Delaware General Corporation Law, 30 ' like every state
corporation statute, has demonstrated a need to protect shareholders in buyout
circumstances. 302 Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 30 3 af-
fords shareholders who dissent from fundamental corporate transactions the
right to receive the appraised "fair value" of their shares.304 The purpose of the
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporation Law Sys-
tem: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough?, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 1257 (2001).
300 See Allen et al., Great Takeover Debate, supra note 276, at 1070.
301 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (2001).
302 See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-13.02 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.580 (West 2002); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-1302 (West 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-1301 to -1331 (Michie 2001); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1300 (Deering Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-113-101 to -302 (West
2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-855 to -872 (West Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
262 (2001 & Supp. 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.73 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.1301 to
.1331 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1301 to-1331 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-342
(Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-1301 to -1331 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11.65 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-44-1 to -20 (Michie
1999 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490.1301 to.1331 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6712 (Supp. 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.13-250 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, §§ 1301 to -
1332 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 3-202 (1999 & Supp. 2003); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 85 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762
(West 2001 & Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.473 (West 1985 & Supp. 2003); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 79-4-13.01 to .31 (2001 & Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.875 (West 2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-827 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,138 (LEXIS through 2003 Reg.
Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. 78.3793 (LEXIS through all 2002 Legis.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-
A:13.01 to .31 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:I 1-I (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-154
(Michie 2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910 (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-13-01 to-
31 (LEXIS through 2002 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-87 (2001 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1091 (West 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 60.551 to .594 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1571 to -1580 (West 1995 & Supp.
2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-74 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-13-101 to -103 (Law. Co-op.
1990 & West Supp. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-6-23 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
48-23-101 to -103 (2002); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.11 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 16-IOA-1301 to -1331 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IA, §§ 13.01 to .31 (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-729 to -741 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.13.020 to .310 (West
1994 & Supp. 2003); W. VA. CODE §§ 31D-13-1301 to -1331 (2003); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
180.1301 to.1331 (West 2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-16-1301 to -1331 (Michie 2003).
303 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
304 Id.
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appraisal remedy is to provide minority shareholders liquidity as an alternative
to remaining as an owner/investor of an entity that was fundamentally altered
from the original entity. 30 5 A court will value the minority shareholder's interest
as a going concern,306 compare it to the merger or tender offer price, and award
monetary damages to the minority.30 7 The valuation consists of an assessment
of a firm's net asset value, earnings value, and market price.:
8
Much has been written on the gross inadequacies of the appraisal rem-
edy, particularly regarding minority shareholder rights following a freeze-out.
309
The appraisal right has been said to be inadequate mainly because among other
reasons, appraisal statutes generally forbid the inclusion of post-merger gains as
an element of value. The appraisal remedy may also be inadequate for deternin-
ing fair value of shares when reliance is placed, as it often is, on market price.
Indeed, in some states appraisal is not available for widely traded stock on the
theory that the market price is the most reliable indicator of value. Emphasis on
market price, which by definition does not take into account the premium that a
minority could always command in a face-to-face negotiation, is clearly damag-
ing to minority interests. Ultimately, this is simply another way in which ap-
310praisal precludes any award of post-merger gains.
Additionally, controlling persons can withhold compensation without
paying interest over the potentially protracted litigation. 3 1  As commentators
recently noted, "this system forces dissenting shareholders to extend majority
shareholders below-market loans resulting in a complete windfall to the com-
pany." 312 Furthermore, knowing that minority shareholders rarely exercise ap-
praisal rights, controlling fiduciaries have an "incentive to discount merger con-
sideration offered to minority shareholders based on an approximation of the
number of shareholders who will not opt in."313
Given these particularly egregious deficiencies with the appraisal rem-
edy, courts should use their equitable authority to further protect minority share-
holders in the freeze-out context. Any method of protecting minority share-
holder rights necessarily differs depending on the number of shareholders, the
305 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN.
L. REV. 661, 666-67 (1998).
306 See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,72 (Del. 1950).
307 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983).
308 See id. at 712.
309 See, e.g., Booth, supra note 29, at 650-54.
310 id. at 650-51.
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number of minority shareholders and many other factors. Entire fairness review
facilitates this predicament as it allows for ad hoc determinations that protect
minority shareholder rights with the necessary flexibility. Moreover, the very
prospect of entire fairness review will impress upon controlling parties to deal
fairly with the minority. Downgrading minority shareholders to the sole remedy
of appraisal will place little, if any, equitable limitation on the will of controlling
persons - particularly in freeze-outs where the controlling fiduciary is on both
sides of the transaction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The informational advantages of controlling stockholders, coupled with
Kahn's inherent suspicions of independent committees and the potential for re-
tributive actions, justify a policy-driven application of entire fairness review to
both negotiated mergers and tender offers commenced by controlling stockhold-
ers. Moreover, there has been no evidence to suggest that the underlying con-
cerns of Kahn and its progeny have been alleviated. Additionally, if these con-
cerns exist in both the tender offer and negotiated merger context, as the court
stressed in Pure Resources, the appropriate judicial response should be to apply
entire fairness to both transaction types, not to cloak both transaction types with
deferential business judgment review.
The time has come for the Delaware Supreme Court to reassess the pol-
icy foundations of Solomon, Siliconix, and Aquila in light of Vice-Chancellor
Strine's discussion in Pure Resources. The court should realize that the Kahn
concerns have not evaporated. Affording business judgment protection to con-
trolling stockholder freeze-out transactions - in either tender offers or negotiated
mergers - ignores the fundamental concerns arising out of conflict transactions.
The fact that a negotiated merger or tender offer is employed ex ante to achieve
the controlling shareholder's objective should not be what determines the ex
post standard of review applied by the Delaware courts. What should be dispo-
sitive is the fact that the "underlying factors which raise the specter of impropri-
ety can never be completely eradicated. 3t 4 The application of entire fairness
review will effectively incentivize fairness in controlling party transactions and
level the playing field between controlling and minority shareholders.
314 Kahn v. Tremont. 694 A.2d 422. 422 (Del. 1997).
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